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In the words of Elmo Hohman, “The method of wage payment in the whaling 
industry was a singular one.” A whaleman, whether captain or greenhand, 
[was] not paid by the day, week, or month, nor was he allowed a certain sum 
for every barrel of oil or for every pound  of  bone  captured.  Instead, his 
earnings consisted of a specified fractional share, known as a lay, of the total 
net proceeds of a voyage, . . . The earnings of a whaleman thus constituted 
a reward not only for the performance of labor under peculiarly trying con- 
ditions, but also for the assumption of personal, business, and physical risks. 
For the size of his lay, representing wages, depended directly upon the busi- 
ness risks centering about price fluctuations, as well as upon the physical 
risks of storm, fire, stranding, and poor luck on the whaling grounds.’ 
The effect of business and physical risks on earnings is illustrated by the expe- 
rience of  1,082 captains of  whaling vessels that sailed from New Bedford in 
the years 1840-58.  Their monthly earnings averaged $98.31, but ranged from 
a low of $0.66 to a high of $345.34.2 
1. Hohman 1928, 217. 222. See also Hohman 1926, 644-71.  Hohman’s description is true of 
the industry through its middle phase. Later, although still risking  the dangers of  the voyage, 
whalemen were protected from the vagaries of the market. “By the closing decades of the nine- 
teenth century, in an attempt to counteract the effect of falling market prices, the lay agreements 
also specified unit prices for oil and bone upon which the lays  were to be computed’ (Butler 
1973,62-63). 
The lay was unusual, but it was not unique. Similar systems have appeared in other industries. 
For example, some Argentine sheep farms in the nineteenth century paid “the person who cared 
for the flocks . . . a third of their production in remuneration” (Cortts Conde 1985,328). “He [the 
shepherd] derived his remuneration either from an interest in the flock (usually a third) or from a 
monthly salary. The former mode of  payment was the more general; the latter may be said to 
be the only one in use now” (US.  Department of  State  1900, 1582 [from D. Mayer, Consul, 
Buenos Aires]). 
2. In these years 1,637 voyages began in New Bedford (see table 5A.1). For 423 we do not have 
a crew contract (the source of lay data). For  115 for which we have a crew contract, the captain’s 
lay is not recorded. In seventeen additional cases the value of the catch has not been computed. 
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A crewman’s life was not easy. He was at personal risk individually while 
working  aboard ship, jointly with his boatmates  while chasing whales, and 
jointly  with his shipmates when their vessel faced unknown  reefs, or hurri- 
canes, or attacks by  angry South Sea islanders or Inuit. Injury and death were 
common. In a letter to the Whalemen’s  Shipping List dated December 1857, the 
captain of the Alexander reported  that,  in a gale the month before,  Patrick 
Connely had been washed overboard and drowned, Thomas Quinn had broken 
his collarbone, Albert Braley had broken his leg, Martin Bodmer had broken 
his back, and “every man on deck was more or less inj~red.”~  Comments such 
as “fell from the stem overboard and was drowned” and “taken out of the boat 
by a foul line, and drowned” are sprinkled through the reports of whaling mas- 
ters. Only the last clause of the April  1856 statement by  the captain of the 
Alfed Gibbs sets it apart from hundreds of others: “Put in to land John Prior, 
who fell from the main top-gallant cross trees in a fit, fracturing his jaw bone, 
and injuring him internally; he providentially fell upon a dog which was lying 
on deck, which no doubt saved his life.”4 
In the boats all crewmen were constantly at risk. The boat and six-man crew 
of the Harvest’s second mate, for example, disappeared while trying to secure 
a dead whale.  More common  are reports such as that of  the captain of  the 
Montgomery: his third mate’s boat and crew were “carried out of sight by the 
whale” to which they were fastened. “The ship cruised two days for the missing 
boat, but could not find her.”5 
The vessel itself did not guarantee safety. Several were attacked by sperm 
whales; the Essex, the Ann Alexandel; and the Kathleen were sunk.6  The Can- 
(In six of these the vessel was lost at sea, condemned in another port, or sold in another port; in 
four others the vessel returned to port clean after a voyage of less than a month, usually because 
of the illness of the captain.) 
The monthly earnings reported in the text are nominal amounts. In 1880 dollars the range is 
from $0.88 to $392.43 (Warren and Pearson “All Commodities” wholesale price index [U.S.  De- 
partment of Commerce 1975, series E-521). 
3. Martin Bodmer had died by the time the captain wrote his letter (WSL 2 March 1858). 
4. WSL 23 April 1844, 5 January 1858, 7 October  1856 (Captain Nichols doesn’t mention the 
fate of the dog). 
5. WSL 23 July 1850, 10 February 1857. In 1865 the WSL (1  1 April) reported having received 
a letter from Hezekiah Allen, the first mate of the Josephine, who said that the Waverly “had lost 
her third mate, Mr. Holt, and a whole boats crew the first of the season. They were fast to a whale 
just at dark, and had not been heard of since.” 
6. The wreck of the Essex is the most famous of these. Her first mate, Owen Chase, wrote (or 
perhaps provided facts to a ghostwriter for) an account of the disaster and its aftermath, Narrative 
of  the Most Extraordinary and Distressing  Shipwreck  of  the  Whale-ship Essex, of  Nantucket; 
Which was Attacked and Finally Destroyed by a Large Spermaceti-Whale, in  the Pacijic Ocean; 
with an Account of  the Unparalleled Sufferings of  the Captain and Crew during a Space of  Ninety- 
three Days at Sea, in Open Boats in the Years 1819 & 1820 (published in 1821), which Melville 
read with close attention and which furnished a model for the sinking of the Pequod. ‘‘I have seen 
Owen Chase, who was chief mate of the Essex at the time of the tragedy; I have read his plain and 
faithful narrative: I have conversed with his son; and all this within a few miles of the scene of the 
catastrophe” (Melville [  18511 1983, chap. 45). 
The whale attacked on 20 November 18 19; the Essex sank on the 22th. The crewmen, in three 
boats,  set out for the coast of  Peru, four thousand miles away.  On 20 December they landed, 152  Chapter 5 
From the sketchbook of  a crew member on the bark Orruy Tuft on her sixth New Bed- 
ford voyage, April 1864 to October 1865. When this drawing was reproduced by Ken- 
neth Martin in WhulemenS Puinrings and Drawings, he titled it “Bowheading: Another 
Unexpected Plunge.” 
Reproduced  courtesy of  The Kendall Whaling Museum,  Sharon, Massachusetts, 
U.S.A. 
ton’s crew, after abandoning their sinking ship, rowed and sailed sixty-five hun- 
dred miles in open whaleboats for forty-nine days before arriving in Guam 
(during the trip they were misidentified  as pirates and almost fired upon by 
unexpectedly, on uninhabited Henderson Island, where they found water and a few fish. Most set 
sail again on 27 December. (Three chose to stay on the island and were eventually rescued in the 
spring.) Chase was in  a five-man boat which, on  12 January  1820, became separated from the 
other two. 
On 20 January the first of Chase’s boatmates died, and “[tlhe next morning we committed him 
to the sea.” On 8 February the second died. “We kept his corpse all night, and in the morning my 
companions began . . . to make preparations to dispose of it in the sea. . . . I addressed them on 
the painful subject of keeping the body for food . . . , [W]e set to work as fast as we were able to 
prepare it so as to prevent its spoiling. We separated his limbs from his body, and cut all the flesh 
from the bones; after which, we opened the body, took out the heart, and then closed it again . . . 
and committed it to the sea. We now first commenced to satisfy the immediate craving of  nature 
from the heart, which we eagerly devoured, and then eat sparingly of a few pieces of the flesh; 
after which, we hung up the remainder, cut in thin strips about the boat, to dry in the sun: we made 
a fire and roasted some of it, to serve us during the next day.” On 18 February they encountered a 
British vessel, the Indian, and were rescued. 
The quotations from Chase’s Narrative are from Heffernan 1981. 153  Labor 
government troops on Tinian).’ When the Parker sank, the survivors among its 
crew had an easier trip to land. They rowed for a mere eight days and seven 
nights of “intense suffering from hunger and thirst” before arriving at Ocean 
Island-but  they were marooned there for six months.* The George Howland 
was  hijacked by  convicts from  an  Ecuadorian penal  settlement when  she 
stopped for wood and water at the Galapagos Islands. The hijackers stranded 
most of  the crew ashore and forced the remainder to sail them to freed~m.~ 
During the Civil War, Confederate raiders destroyed many whalers, beginning 
with the firing of the Eben Dodge by the Sumpter in December 1861. Despite 
their misfortunes the crewmen of  these vessels fared better than those of the 
Emigrant: a captain reported finding her capsized, but “nothing is known of 
the crew” (WSL  4 February 1862, 16 October 1849). 
And then there were native peoples. The crews escaped the wrecks of the 
Arabella, the New Bedford, and the America off Kamchatka, but eleven men 
were killed by Inuit when they came ashore. In  1853 the Znga  was seized by 
natives of Pleasant Island in the Carolines, and the white members of the crew 
were killed. Two years later, two South Sea islanders stole the John, killing the 
captain, the first and second mates, and many seamen in the process (WSL  21 
October 1851,20April 1853,6  November 1855). 
Hohman (1926,65 1) examined the records of a number of whaling voyages, 
but it is not clear which voyages they were or how he analyzed the data he 
found. He says only, “The detailed figures serving as a warrant for these state- 
ments were secured through an  analysis of  hundreds of  individual accounts 
found in the collection of scores of original manuscript whaling account-books 
now in the New Bedford Public Library.” 
This chapter expands Hohman’s  work in some new  directions, modifies a 
7.  The Canron struck a reef “said not to be laid down in any chart” (WSL  24April 1855). 
8. During their sojourn on Ocean Island, “it was estimated that they killed rising of 7000 sea 
fowls, and about 50 seals. From the old wreck of the Parker they obtained some pieces of copper, 
which were manufactured into cooking utensils. They sent off  120 sea fowls, with tallied pieces 
of  wood attached to them, hoping some one would be caught, which would in hieroglyphic lan- 
guage relate the situation of the crew of the Parker. Thus month after month passed away. Every 
morning and evening the captain was accustomed in his tent to conduct religious services.” There 
is no record of anyone’s deciphering their hieroglyphics, but they were eventually rescued by the 
James Srewarr of New Brunswick and the Nassau of New Bedford (WSL  7 November 1843). 
9. The George Howland’s captain seems to have unintentionally connived at his misfortune. The 
convicts told him they wanted to escape, and he allowed his cooper to help them repair an old 
whaleboat they’d found for that purpose. Then he employed them to catch four of his crew who 
had deserted on their island, offering the convicts provisions for their escape in exchange. He 
entertained several of them on his ship, he went to visit them on land, and he set up a system of 
signals that allowed the convicts, having seized him, to lure two more boatloads of his crew to 
shore and capture. The story is told by the cooper, not by  the captain (WSL  20 April, 27 April, 4 
May, 8 June, 5 July, 10 August, 12 October, 2 November 1852). 
Thirteen  years later, the  WSL  (18 July  1865) published  the following  news  story:  “CLAIM 
AwARDED.-The  claim of the owners of ship George Howland, of this port, upon the government 
of  Ecuador, for the seizure of said ship by convicts at the Gallipagos Islands in 1852, and taken 
by  them to Guyaquil, and the subsequent breaking up  of  the voyage,  has been allowed to the 
claimants. The amount awarded is $50,000.” 154  Chapter 5 
few of his findings, and directly disputes others, At its core is an examination 
of 34,753 labor contracts drawn between whaling agents and the crewmen who 
signed on to 1,250 voyages that left New Bedford between 1 January 1840 and 
31 December 1858, and between 1 January and 31 December 1866 (see tables 
5A.1 and 5A.3). These are almost three-quarters of the voyages that departed 
New Bedford during those years.’”The labor data have been linked with infor- 
mation on the voyages, permitting the contracts to be examined in light of the 
vessels used, the grounds hunted, and the results of  the hunt. 
Twenty-nine men manned a typical ship, twenty-six, a typical bark. Differ- 
ences between crews seem to have been related to sizes of  vessels, dates of 
sailing, projected lengths of voyages, and vessels’ destinations, rather than to 
differences in rigging; the crews of a typical ship and a typical bark were orga- 
nized  very  similarly.  Each  vessel  had  (1) a  captain  and  some  number  of 
mates-always  at least one, usually three, sometimes as many as five; (2) a set 
of  skilled professional  mariners-between  two and  six boatsteerers,  some- 
times a shipkeeper; (3) a number of  artisans-almost  always a cooper and a 
carpenter, often a blacksmith, occasionally a boatbuilder, a painter, a sailmaker, 
a caulker, or a coppersmith; (4) some service personnel-almost  always a cook 
and a steward; (5) a number of  seamen-some  skilled, some semi-skilled, 
some unskilled (“greenhands”), and often a boy or two. Table 5.1 and figure 
5.1 show the occupational structure of  a typical whaling crew. (They do not 
take account of the structural changes that occurred between 1840 and 1866.) 
5.1  The Whaleman’s Lay 
Each member of a whaler’s crew, from the captain to the cabin boy, received 
a predetermined fraction of his vessel’s net catch. Even in this day of  sophisti- 
cated businessmen-actors, the experience of the motion picture and television 
industries shows that there’s many a slip ’twixt the gross and the net. It is easy 
to cheat on expenses, and thus preferable for the entertainer to draw a contract 
that depends on a percentage of gross rather than net income. Read Variety or 
the Los Angeles Times, though, and you will see that actors still sign net con- 
tracts. 
In nineteenth-century New Bedford, whalemen, if not agents and captains, 
were  no more sophisticated: the lay was calculated on the net  value  of  the 
10. The voyages seem to be representative, so far as value of  output and voyage duration are 
concerned. See table 5A.2.  The 1,250 voyages include all but the nine unreadable lists among the 
Whalemen’s Shipping Papers in the collection of the Melville Whaling Room at the New Bedford 
Free Public Library that (1) include information on the whaleman’s station and lay, and (2) pertain 
to voyages in the Voyages Data Set. 
The Stations and Lays Data Set contains 36,453 records, but most analyses in this chapter refer 
only to  the records of crew members who sailed with  the vessel when it left New Bedford-a 
total of  34,753. Crewmen added later (many of  whom replaced men who deserted, died, or were 
discharged) are generally left out of account. We  believe that the crew lists include only a small 
fraction of replacement crewmen. See chapter 3 for a description of the Stations and Lays Data Set. 155  Labor 
Table 5.1  Average Numbers of Crewmen in Occupational Categories, New 
Bedford Whaling Voyages, Sailing Years 1840-58  and 1866 
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3.26  3.21 
3.59  3.48 
0.23  0.22 
0.91  0.89 
0.58  0.55 
0.82  0.78 
0.14  0.13 
1.06  1  .oo 
1.04  0.99 
2.35  2.19 
2.67  2.55 
10.85  10.21 
0.63  0.57 
29.16  27.80 
Source:  Stations and Lays Data Set (see chapter 3) 
Notes:  The “Total” column reports averages, by occupation, of all crewmen listed on the vessel’s 
roster. The “Sailed” column reports averages only of those crewmen who left New Bedford with 
the vessel. See chapter 3 for a discussion of this difference. 
Not all crewmen had only one occupation aboard ship. This table includes those with two (for 
example, “cooper and ordinary seaman”), counting them as one-half a man for each occupation. 
Other tables in this chapter exclude dual-occupation crewmen. See appendix 5B for a description 
of paired occupations and an analysis of the effect of two occupations on crewmen’s lays. 
catch.” The difference between gross and net was a standard set of charges 
incurred during the voyage. The nature (not the amount) of these charges was 
specified in advance, and the labor contract was written to guarantee that the 
crewman (along with the agent and owners) bore his share. Charges always 
included  payments  for  pilotage,  wharfing,  cooperage,  watching,  cleaning, 
11. In regard to  the sophistication of captains, A. B. C.  Whipple (1954, 126-29)  relates the 
following story: Captain Thomas Scullun of the Cape Horn Pigeon was stopped by  a Russian 
naval vessel in the Sea of Okhotsk in September 1892. The Russians charged that he had been 
hunting in Russian territorial  waters, and Scullun (and his vessel) were taken to Vladivostok. 
Scullun insisted that he had been in international waters. After nine days the Russians let him go, 
but by then it was too late to hunt the Arctic that year. Scullun billed the Russians for the expenses 
he had incurred while in Vladivostok harbor-a  small amount-plus  the opportunity cost of miss- 
ing the hunting season, for a total bill of $49,500. The controversy went on for ten years. The 
Russians finally gave in and agreed to abide by the decision of an arbitrator, the arbitration to take 
place in the Netherlands. Scullun amended his charges to include interest for the ten years, and 
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Fig. 5.1  Proportions of crewmen in various occupational categories, New 
Bedford whaling voyages, sailing years 1840-58  and 1866 
Source: Computed from the Stations and Lays Data Set. See table 5.1. 
loading, and unloading.12 Toward midcentury, as the industry’s organizational 
structure became more complex, charges began to include commissions and 
insurance on oil and bone shipped home during the voyage. 
The whaleman’s contract does not appear to have presented  the problems 
12. See, for example, the crew contract for the Oneida’s 1857 voyage: “In consideration of the 
said Owners having released the Officers and Seamen from their obligations to load and discharge 
said Ship at the commencement and termination of her voyage, each of the Officers and Seamen, 
parties hereto, consent and agree that the Sum of Ten dollars may be deducted from our several 
shares for the loading of said Ship, and the sum of  Eight dollars for the discharging thereof, and 
that said sums may be respectively charged to, allowed and paid by  us. And it is further agreed 
that the Sum of Three dollars may be charged in our several accounts, and shall be allowed and 
paid by  us at the termination of  said voyage for the expence of the Medicine Chest on board said 
Ship. And it is further agreed that interest and insurance upon all advances to us respectively, 
during said voyage, together with a commission of  2  1/2 per cent on the proceeds Sales of  the 
cargo for guaranty of the payment for the same may be charged by  said Owners, and deducted 
from our respective shares or lays” (Whalemen’s Shipping Papers). 157  Labor 
that plague the entertainment industry. The expenditures were all made by the 
captain, the value of whose lay depended on the size of the net. Moreover, the 
captain’s behavior  was monitored-on  the spot by  the other ship’s officers, 
whose income also depended inversely on the size of the charges, at a distance 
by the agent, who had the same incentive. 
Crew members were usually paid in cash or in a bill of exchange that could 
be converted to cash, but the agent could, if he chose, give them their shares in 
kind. A crewman was entitled to a full share if he returned on the vessel on 
which he sailed, a prorated share (based on the catch to date) if he died or was 
discharged for illness or other good cause. Until the 1860s he was not legally 
entitled to any remuneration if he deserted.I3 
It is difficult to determine the effect of the agent’s right to pay in kind. Hoh- 
man suggests two reasons for the frequent use of such payments when a crew- 
man  was discharged during a voyage. First, since there  was often  a lack of 
information about the prices of whale products, it was difficult to agree on the 
level of remuneration.  Second, if  the  payment  was  substantial, the captain 
would want to preserve his limited cash reserves. The first point implies that 
paying men in oil avoided the necessity  of agreeing on prices. But since the 
seaman’s payment  was a net value, resort to prices could not be avoided; in 
ports with U.S. consuls, these officials provided the necessary  prices.14  Hoh- 
man’s second point, however, seems to be valid. At least seamen often received 
oil when discharged. For example, over the course of eight midcentury years a 
number of  whalemen of the ship Canton were paid off during voyages with 
oil, in amounts that ranged from 74 to 393 gallons.15 
At the end of  a voyage, payment in kind  was usually made only if  there 
was a dispute between  crewmen  and agent over the value of the  catch. In- 
kind payments are rarely mentioned either in contemporary accounts or in the 
whaling  literature, but a letter from the New  Bedford agent and  shipowner 
Charles W.  Morgan to his Boston lawyer suggests they may have been more 
common than the standard literature implies. 
13. This rule was originally based on British common law,  but it was often reconfinned  in 
American courts. In  1851, for example, in a case involving a minor who signed on the whaler 
Abraham H. Howlund and after some time deserted, the U.S. district court in Boston “held that 
unjustifiable and continued desertion, occuring during the voyage, worked in all cases an entire 
forfeiture of wages” (WSL  5 August 1851). 
14. “Honolulu . . . CIRCULAR  RATES. The price fixed by the Consuls for payment of discharged 
seamen is 40 cents per gallon for Polar oil, and $1,20 for sperm, and 33 cents for bone” (WSL 22 
January 1856). On 13 December 1864 the newspaper reported, in addition to the prices set by the 
consul at Honolulu, a new rule “established by  the Consulate. . . . The usual deduction of  8 per 
cent. for leakage and shrinkage, from the above prices, will be allowed only, in cases where the 
masters shall file an affidavit in writing, stating to the best of his knowledge and belief, that the 
oil and hone, upon which the seamen’s lays are to be calculated, are the full amount taken during 
their several terms of service.” 
15. Hohman 1928, 226. See also Whitecar  1864, 168: “a French cook, who left the Alexander 
at Stewart’s Island and joined the Eliza. He was discharged from the Alexander, and the oil belong- 
ing to him was rolled ashore.” 158  Chapter 5 
The universal  custom is for the owner to make up the voyage at a certain 
price after which it is optional with them to take it, or deliver the crew as 
they may elect & it is always the right of the crew to demand their oil but 
they cannot demand money if the owner is unwilling to pay it. The Condor’s 
cargo has in part remained on the wharf & in store since its arrival & I have 
never yet settled with all concerned. I have this day been delivering to the 
Capt and one boatsteerer their parts or share of  the oil and coffee as we 
never could agree upon a price & I have after several weeks delay declined 
purchasing much of the oil of another crew arrived since the Condor & many 
of them have taken away their oil & some have yet left it on the wharf. . . . 
P.S. You  will understand that voyages are always made up at a certain 
price whether the crew intends to purchase their shares or not. They [the 
agents] often decline purchasing & on the other hand the crew often de- 
clines selling.I6 
Whatever the importance of the right to pay in kind, the rules governing the 
earnings of men who failed to complete voyages became steadily more im- 
portant as the duration of voyages increased-first  as the fleet moved to more 
distant grounds and then as agents found they could keep vessels at sea longer 
by using Pacific cities as transshipment points. Between  1840-41  and 1957- 
58, the average voyage length in the New Bedford fleet as a whole increased 
from thirty-one to forty-three months: in the Atlantic  from sixteen to thirty- 
two, in the Indian Ocean from twenty-seven to thirty-eight, and in the Pacific 
from thirty-eight  to forty-four. (Among the  1,250 voyages examined in this 
chapter, six lasted five years or more.) 
There was a high and increasing level of labor turnover. The George How- 
land, for example, a New Bedford ship that normally carried a crew of twenty- 
eight to thirty, sailed six times between 1840 and 1866. Over these voyages the 
number of  whalemen  who died,  were discharged,  or deserted  ranged  from 
twelve to twenty-four, averaging 63 percent of the original crews.” 
As Hohman points out, the form of the labor contract was idiosyncratic: 
each  crewman  negotiated  his  lay.  The  flavor  of  such  negotiations  comes 
through in a letter from Charles W.  Morgan to his captain, Thomas A. Norton 
(21 November 1834, Morgan Collection), discussing the staffing of the Hectol: 
After spelling out the range of lays that he was “accustomed to give in a four 
boat ship” (third mate 1/70 to 1/75, boatsteerers 1/90 to 1/95, seamen 1/125 to 
1/130, ordinary seamen 1/135 to 1/150, greenhands 1/150  to 1/180, boys green 
1/185 to  1/200, and  boys  not  green  1/150 to  1/175), he  continues:  “Mr. 
16. Charles W.  Morgan to S. Bartlett (Boston), 24 May  1837, Morgan Collection. The Condor 
had arrived thirty-six days before Morgan put pen to paper. 
17. George HowlartdAccount Book. Desertion was not an entirely new phenomenon, as a report 
from 1763 indicates. The sloop Doh  put in to Cape Cod to take on water “prior to its departure 
for the whaling grounds, and four men who had signed for the voyage silently jumped ship and 
disappeared,  ‘Like Roges they are and we must go to the Vineyard  [Martha’s] for more hands.’ 
Although the vessel eventually managed to put to sea, ‘with a fool crew,’ the delay cost them four 
days” (Vickers 1985, 287). 159  Labor 
Mayhew (a third mate) had  1/65 last voyage but that was higher than I have 
before given. I think  1/70 a fair lay for Mr. Wimfrenn but would give 1/67 
rather than not have him.” 
The traditional dividing line between good and mediocre wages was a lay 
of  MOO.  Hohman  says officers, coopers, and  boatsteerers received  short 
lays-lays  less than 1/100.’8  This is generally correct, but there was a boat- 
steerer on the Sappho in 1866 and a cooper on the Chandler Price in 1854 who 
received only 1/150. There were also two coopers and 114 boatsteerers whose 
lays were between 1/105 and 1/140. On the other side, the Stations and Lays 
Data Set lists four carpenters, thirteen cooks, thirty-three stewards, seventeen 
shipkeepers, nineteen seamen, ten ordinary seamen, and forty-two greenhands 
who received lays shorter than 1/100. 
The outliers fall into two categories. Most seem to result from the perceived 
ex ante competence of the individual crewman-that  is, from the agent’s and 
the crewman’s recognition that there were substantial differences in potential 
productivity among applicants for the same job. Each of the seven boatsteerers 
who sailed with the vessel from New Bedford and received a lay longer than 
1/120 were on  a voyage whose agent had signed his peers at much shorter 
lays.19 The three other boatsteerers on the Sappho in  1866, for example, re- 
ceived lays of  1/75, 1/75, and MOO. Well-paid seamen on vessels hunting in 
the Indian, Pacific, and Western Arctic grounds were often characterized as 
“able” or “extra skilled”; their shipmates received lays more in line with tra- 
dition. 
Skill differences do not explain all of the outliers. Vessels cruising in the 
Atlantic were typically smaller and had smaller crews than vessels sailing to 
more distant grounds. Since the distribution of net income between labor and 
capital was, on average, about the same in all grounds (one-third to labor and 
two-thirds to capital), lays were necessarily shorter in the Atlantic than else- 
where.20 
Most whalemen filled one station at a time, but a few filled two at once. 
Those with double occupations are treated in appendix 5B. 
Hohman (1928,217) says, “The able and ordinary seamen, stewards, cooks, 
and blacksmiths were entitled to shares which varied from MOO  to 1/160; the 
green hands and boys had to be content with ‘long lays’ which fluctuated from 
18. Or greater, depending on how you look at it. A lay of  1/90 is shorter than a lay of  11100. 
The denominator is smaller; the amount is bigger. Hohman (1926,645) says short lays were 11100 
or less, and long lays, 11100 or more-that  is, 11100 is both short and long. 
19. Although the lay was a fraction, it was often referred to as the reciprocal, that is, a lay of  I/ 
175 was often called “a 175.” 
20. This does not mean that seamen in the Atlantic made higher monthly earnings. For example, 
imagine two vessels, one of three hundred tons and a crew of thirty, the other of one hundred tons 
and a crew of ten. Suppose further that the net values of the monthly catches of the two vessels 
are proportionate to their tonnages: $1,250 and $416.67, respectively. If the share of the crew in 
the net proceeds is 30 percent in each case, the seamen on each vessel would average $12.50 per 
month. The average lay of the large vessel would be 11100, that of the small, U33.3. 160  Chapter 5 
1/160 to  1/200; and instances of  fractions as small as 1/250, or even  1/350, 
were not unknown.” This is generally, if not exactly, correct. Well-paid stew- 
ards, cooks, and seamen have been noted, but they were the exceptions: most 
fell into Hohman’s long-lay range. There are contracts for boys that called for 
lays as low as 1/4,500, several that worked out to be less than  1/10,000 (e.g., 
ten cents per month), twenty-four boys who signed on for “clothes,” and one 
boy in the Stations and Lays Data Set who received no payment whatever (he 
signed on for “board”). 
Hohman (1928, 230) says that, with the exception of those of captains and 
mates, lays became longer as time passed. “His wage bargain entitled him [the 
whaleman],  as time went on, to a smaller fractional share of the voyages for 
which he  shipped.” This degradation he attributes to three factors:  (1) “the 
gradually deteriorating character and efficiency of the crews,” (2) an increasing 
“temptation to exploit . . . inferior crews,” and (3) the substitution of  capital 
for labor (233). For the period covered by this study, Hohman’s generalization 
concerning trends in lays is only partly correct. In addition, his estimates cap- 
ture both the time trend and the effect of shifts in the grounds hunted; he fails 
to recognize, let alone disentangle, the two. 
Table 5.2 gives average lays by year and ground for the twelve most common 
occupations. Table 5.3 gives all-ground averages for an additional five occupa- 
tions that appear too infrequently to permit ground-by-ground  breakdowns. 
Between 1840 and 1866 lays rose for some occupations and fell for others. 
As a result, although the all-year averages in table 5.4, computed on the basis 
of the data underlying tables 5.2 and 5.3, give an accurate picture of the shares 
earned by occupational groups across the entire period, they do not describe 
the earnings hierarchy at any particular time. Note that the range in lays is very 
wide.  If the unskilled  seaman is the comparison base, a captain on average 
received twelve times as large a share, a cooper more than three times as large, 
and a boy less than six-tenths. 
Much of  Hohman’s discussion is focused not on relative lays but on their 
redistribution, and particularly on the lengthening of all but those of captains 
and mates.21  Starting at the top of the income hierarchy, the data show a short- 
ening  of  officers’  lays  (i.e.,  an  increase  in  their  potential  earnings)  from 
1840-43  to 1855-58:  captains’ lays by  18 percent, first mates’ by 24, second 
mates’ by 21, third mates’ by 20, and fourth mates’ by 10. 
For skilled workers  the picture  is less clear.  On the  one hand,  between 
1840-43  and 1855-58  coopers’ lays shortened by 9 percent, shipkeepers’ by 
12 percent, and stewards’ and boatsteerers’ by less than  1 percent.22  On the 
21. The terms lengthening and shortening are somewhat confusing.  Since the lay was often 
referred to by its reciprocal, a change from a 150 to a 170 was called a lengthening, despite the 
fact that it involved a reduction of the worker’s share from 0.67 to 0.59 percent. Similarly, a change 
from a 19 to a 16.5 was called a shortening, despite the increase from 5.3 to 6.1 percent. 
22. According to Brown (1887, 239). “From the time the vessel arrives at her wharf until she 
sails, unless she is laid up for a considerable length of time, she is in charge of a ship-keeper, who 
has absolute control.” If  the captain headed a boat, the shipkeeper was in control of  the vessel 
while the captain was engaged in the hunt. Table 5.2  Average Lays by Occupation and Ground, New Bedford Whaling Voyages, 
Sailing Years 1840-58  and 1866 
All  Western 











































A. Captainb (N = 1,125) 
16.5  15  16.5 
16.5  55  15.8 
16.5  58  15.3 
16.6  47  - 
16.0  70  13.0 
16.6  52  15.2 
16.0  58  14.0 
16.0  52  - 
16.2  55  15.0 
15.8  53  12.0 
15.0  67  15.5 
14.8  106  14.2 
14.6  54  14.9 
14.6  75  13.5 
14.1  74  12.8 
13.6  63  13.3 
13.2  57  12.7 
13.8  51  12.0 
14.0  37  14.0 
14.0  26  12.9 
15.2  14.0 
2  17.0  1 
4  16.5  17 
8  16.4  24 
16.2  5 
3  15.5  15 
5  16.4  5 
4  15.3  11 
15.4  9 
1  16.0  4 
1  15.8  13 
2  14.3  7 
10  13.3  8 
7  14.4  7 
6  15.3  7 
5  13.9  11 
6  12.7  9 
3  12.5  4 
1  14.4  7 
2  14.6  6 
12  15.0  2 
82  15.2  172 
16.5  11  - 
16.6  34  - 
17.0  22  - 
16.3  40  - 
16.3  32  - 
16.3  29  - 
16.2  45  - 
15.9  35  17.0  2 
15.1  41  15.3  16 
15.3  56  14.8  27 
14.6  34  14.5  6 
14.7  48  14.6  14 
14.0  40  15.0  15 
13.9  36  13.9  7 
13.4  34  13.1  8 
13.7  29  14.0  10 
14.0  21  14.0  7 
15.0  9  16.0  2 
15.3  649  14.6  114 
16.9  27  - 
16.7  26  - 































































2  29.0 
4  25.1 
8  25.5 
25.7 
3  24.1 
5  25.4 
4  24.7 
24.3 
1  23.7 
1  23.8 
2  21.3 
9  20.2 
9  20.1 
6  19.9 
5  20.5 
6  20.2 
3  19.5 
2  19.2 
2  19.8 
15  21.3 
87  22.8 
1  28.4 
17  26.5 
24  26.5 
7  26.9 
15  26.8 
5  26.0 
11  25.9 
10  26.4 
3  25.7 
13  24.9 
7  22.2 
10  21.9 
7  21.7 
7  21.3 
11  20.4 
12  20.2 
6  19.6 
10  19.8 
8  21.0 
2  22.5 































23.0  2 
22.9  17 
21.9  28 
21.2  6 
20.7  16 
21.3  17 
20.3  9 
19.6  11 
19.2  13 
21.4  11 
22.4  4 
21.2  134 
(continued) Table 5.2  (continued) 
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All  Western 










































































































2  43.0 
1  41.0 
7  40.8 
42.7 
3  37.5 
4  37.8 
3  38.0 
39.9 
1  38.8 
1  38.3 
2  37.1 
9  37.7 
9  37.3 
5  33.1 
5  35.2 
6  33.2 
3  35.7 
2  32.3 
2  30.8 
15  32.0 









































































42.8  2 
37.1  17 
36.9  31 
40.0  6 
37.9  17 
35.5  17 
33.9  9 
34.3  13 
32.7  15 
35.1  12 
37.3  4 
36.1  143 
D. Third Mate (N = 1,024) 
65.3  12 
64.2  36 
61.1  35 
66.1  36 
60.9  57 
62.9  43 
63.3  41 
61.6  45 
61.9  50 
59.4  42 
58.6  60 
54.8  102 
54.5  51 
52.5  73 
52.3  71 
51.2  61 
50.9  68 
49.3  68 
54.2  47 

























1  60.2 
65.0 
3  56.5 
1  57.2 





6  52.2 
4  52.2 
3  52.6 
3  50.7 
2  52.3 
56.6 
1  44.6 
1  52.6 
10  55.0 









































































57.5  2 
60.6  17 
55.1  31 
56.2  6 
53.4  17 
52.4  19 
51.5  10 
47.9  13 
51.4  16 
56.3  12 
52.0  4 
54.0  147 Table 5.2  (continued) 
~~ 
All  Western 










































































































6  88.3 
9  84.9 
20  84.2 
82.6 
5  76.6 
10  87.1 
11  80.0 
77.8 
2  82.5 
1  82.9 
3  71.3 
25  80.3 
21  85.0 
15  75.3 
II  74.5 
15  87.1 
6  79.9 
6  81.8 
6  83.3 
49  88.6 









































































92.0  7 
91.4  62 
93.5  114 
92.9  21 
88.6  60 
89.1  73 
86.6  31 
86.8  45 
89.9  60 
90.2  46 
95.6  18 
90.5  537 
F.  Cooper (N = 983) 
59.0  12 
56.7  40 
61.6  42 
61.3  44 
59.4  60 
54.3  46 
58.8  50 
57.0  42 
56.7  41 
58.1  36 
52.9  50 
54.2  95 
55.9  53 
56.8  73 
58.6  77 
54.7  54 
52.5  54 
55.4  61 
55.2  35 























2  55.0 
1  55.6 
4  60.3 
60.8 
1  59.6 
3  51.0 





4  61.1 
6  62.5 
6  54.4 
4  58.5 
3  58.1 
1  53.0 
1  57.5 
2  49.0 
6  61.0 
































































































(continued) Table 5.2  (continued) 
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All  Western 


































































36  90.0 
32  128.3 
29  - 
43  137.5 
34  100.0 
40  127.5 
27  ~ 
35  150.0 
46  - 
85  145.7 
41  148.8 
53  140.0 
65  150.0 
45  149.4 
47  - 
58  100.0 
29  160.0 
20  173.1 
145.9 
40  - 
150.0 
I  152.2 
3  153.0 
152.0 
2  146.7 
1  166.7 
2  154.2 
156.0 
I  157.9 
145.0 
7  163.8 
4  166.0 
2  165.0 
1  157.5 
5  180.0 
162.5 
1  171.7 
1  175.8 
8  185.0 
39  160.0 
- 
1  151.3 
9  151.2 
13  151.1 
5  150.0 
9  158.6 
3  162.2 
6  165.5 
5  162.9 
163.8 
8  161.9 
3  166.7 
8  172.1 
5  171.0 
3  167.4 
12  171.5 
6  171.5 
4  177.6 
9  175.0 
6  168.5 
2  198.8 
117  166.6 
4- 
26  - 
14  - 
16  - 
25  - 
16  - 
22  - 
14  - 
38  - 
21  157.5  2 
29  170.4  13 
43  174.4  25 
24  167.5  6 
35  175.4  12 
33  175.0  16 
23  176.9  8 
27  161.4  7 
32  170.0  13 
13  177.9  7 
8  185.0  1 
463  172.6  110 






















13  140.0 
53  103.3 
58  111.6 
50  - 
70  106.7 
53  113.0 
64  115.0 
55  - 
58  130.0 
51  - 
68  82.5 
I15  128.5 
64  120.0 
81  131.4 
82  128.0 
70  125.8 
74  127.5 
74  125.0 
51  132.5 
36  148.0 
125.3 
1  150.0 
3  138.9 
8  134.0 
131.7 
3  135.4 
5  142.0 
4  135.0 
134.4 
1  140.0 
137.1 
2  122.9 
10  141.7 
9  144.6 
7  130.0 
5  131.0 
6  143.0 
2  138.6 
2  131.5 
2  148.1 
15  145.0 
85  136.6 
I  141.0 
16  135.7 
24  138.0 
7  141.1 
14  144.5 
5  147.5 
12  141.9 
9  140.7 
4  147.2 
14  133.9 
7  142.6 
12  143.4 
7  139.5 
6  141.1 
10  144.8 
10  142.6 
5  143.9 
10  145.4 
8  146.2 
2  150.0 
183  142.6 
10  - 
34  - 
22  - 
27  - 
42  - 
26  - 
34  - 
31  - 
48  - 
33  140.0  2 
42  145.3  16 
58  147.7  31 
40  146.4  7 
48  140.5  19 
46  143.9  18 
40  156.7  9 
45  146.9  13 
41  142.6  17 
25  148.8  13 
13  149.0  5 
705  146.0  150 Table 5.2  (continued) 
~ 
All  Western 

































































16  130.0 
50  90.0 
56  126.9 
68  147.5 
47  114.0 
54  117.5 
52  - 
56  160.0 
49  - 
61  - 
110  115.6 
60  105.0 
85  128.0 
78  126.0 
65  111.0 
77  131.7 
72  117.5 
48  125.0 
38  125.3 
120.9 
50  - 
1  115.0 
2  137.7 
8  126.8 
140.0 
2  134.0 
5  142.0 
4  135.0 
130.0 
1  136.4 
142.3 
120.0 
8  135.6 
7  134.7 
5  130.0 
5  130.0 
5  129.0 
3  138.0 
2  123.0 
2  144.3 
16  132.5 
76  133.0 
1  141.7 
15  133.8 
22  139.1 
7  135.6 
15  138.8 
5  139.0 
9  137.0 
8  142.2 
3  140.5 
I1  135.6 
6  139.2 
9  140.1 
6  132.6 
6  134.8 
8  135.1 
10  131.1 
5  135.6 
10  131.5 
7  136.4 
2  139.3 
165  136.6 
13  - 
33  - 
22  - 
27  - 
41  - 
21  - 
28  - 
29  - 
46  - 
34  145.0  2 
40  145.0  14 
58  137.8  30 
40  140.0  6 
55  137.6  17 
45  133.1  18 
37  143.3  9 
44  136.4  16 
39  138.8  17 
25  142.3  11 
14  146.0  5 
691  139.0  145 






















44  134.6  8  150.0 
133  98.3  6  136.3 
164  117.2  26  134.8 
154  -  145.9 
188  121.5  10  137.1 
104  117.5  8  145.0 
155  125.6  8  137.2 
128  -  141.9 
127  135.0  4  142.0 
118  125.0  3  147.7 
151  97.1  7  142.2 
212  143.1  27  143.8 
98  129.0  10  151.3 
131  133.2  14  145.0 
120  125.0  9  134.6 
114  138.5  10  163.3 
134  143.0  5  151.8 
172  133.3  3  153.6 
81  -  146.7 
115  155.3  46  163.0 

































































































(continued) Table 5.2  (continued) 
All  Western 

































































56  144.2 
202  130.0 
147  120.0 
168  - 
161  135.0 
134  131.7 
134  146.5 
155  - 
151  150.0 
119  135.0 
120  - 
299  149.1 
162  140.7 
191  132.7 
169  129.4 
142  164.6 
117  156.4 
199  140.0 
156  142.2 
136  169.3 
145.8 
6- 
19  151.1 
11  148.5 
149.8 
5  142.7 
18  166.9 
10  148.4 
147.7 
1  161.7 
3  155.0 
152.1 
23  170.6 
14  157.3 
11  159.5 
9  156.2 
8  166.6 
I1  174.6 
3  163.0 
9  181.0 
42  190.0 
203  157.8 
161.9 
58  161.4 
64  167.7 
21  165.5 
22  170.8 
8  165.8 
18  169.5 
13  170.7 
6  170.5 
17  160.4 
16  173.4 
33  172.9 
12  177.2 
10  167.7 
17  168.2 
32  165.5 
12  170.2 
25  171.4 
30  174.9 
4  195.1 































168.3  6 
168.0  25 
173.7  78 
168.2  11 
176.5  48 
176.8  46 
175.0  20 
168.9  9 
177.0  56 
185.5  43 
186.7  36 
176.8  378 






















122  153.9  9 
441  112.3  22 
490  140.1  47 
388  - 
658  148.6  25 
526  142.4  26 
565  147.1  33 
513  160.0  11 
496  158.8  8 
715  104.2  18 
1,287  165.8  82 
664  151.6  85 
929  159.5  43 
930  148.3  43 
866  157.8  60 
907  150.2  27 
746  159.7  15 
551  170.5  20 
322  189.6  139 
158.5  713 






















12  178.1 
138  180.3 
190  179.8 
47  179.8 
133  185.5 
57  188.5 
86  186.1 
87  187.9 
39  191.1 
133  186.2 
53  186.6 
71  191.4 
64  191.6 
80  187.1 
96  187.3 
131  189.3 
61  194.8 
95  194.4 
75  193.7 
14  214.2 
1,662  188.9 
85  - 
281  - 
210  - 
204  - 
392  - 
314  - 
317  - 
411  - 
322  197.9  21 
443  194.2  194 
714  196.1  367 
437  191.5  74 
615  192.0  187 
541  192.2  218 
484  193.1  129 
545  192.8  184 
432  199.9  164 
303  197.5  137 
109  205.4  51 
7,409  194.9  1,726 
250  - 
Source: Stations and Lays Data Set. 167  Labor 
Table 5.2  (continued) 
Nores: These figures are reciprocals. A lay reported here as 16.5, for example, is actually 1/16.5, or 6.06 
percent. The table excludes crewmen who signed on in more than one capacity-for  example, shipkeeper 
and blacksmith. It also excludes crewmen who signed on after the beginning of the voyage. 
”“All Grounds” figures are averages over all the available voyages, including those sixty-one that went to 
more than one ground. They are not averages over the voyages reported in the ground-specific columns 
of this table. 
bThe  lays almost certainly understate the actual incomes of captains. In 125 cases (10 percent of the crew 
lists we analyzed), the captain signed a special contract that was not reported with the normal contracts. 
(Special contracts were also signed by  a few mates and one boatsteerer.) When these special contracts 
could be found, they usually involved some bonus payment over and above the lay. This table reports the 
average lays among those for whom lays were reported in  the crew lists; it excludes those who signed 
special contracts. 
cThe value of the cook’s lay was almost always less than his total income from the voyage. In addition to 
the lay he was typically entitled to between one-third and one-half of the slush fund, as the money received 
from the sale of slush (refuse grease and fat from cooking) and other ship’s refuse was called. On the 
voyage of the George Howland that began on 25 June 1846, for example, Andrew Lewis, the cook, earned 
$357.73 from his 1/140 lay and an additional $124.00 from his one-half of the slush. His effective lay was 
thus 1/104. See George Howland Acount Book. Captains also frequently shared in the slush. 
“Seamen,  able seamen, whaling seamen, extra prepared seamen, bow hands, leads, and lookouts. 
‘Ordinary  seamen, oarsmen, mariners, “one voyage,” “has been coasting,” “past green hand,” “used to 
boat,” “5 years crawling,” “has been to sea,” “extra green hand,” boatmen, and “in the boats.” 
‘Greenhands, landsmen,  green  oarsmen, green  Portuguese,  green  Canakas,  green Malays,  “Spanish 
Islands,” green blacks, and green colored. 
other hand, the lays of cooks, carpenters, blacksmiths, and miscellaneous arti- 
sans lengthened by 5, 13, 15, and 11 percent, respectively. For seamen, Hoh- 
man is unambiguously correct. The lays of skilled seamen lengthened by  14 
percent and those of semi-skilled and unskilled seamen by 8. 
Hohman did not distinguish ground-to-ground differences in lays, but there 
were systematic differentials that did not erode over time and were responsible 
for a significant fraction of the lengthening he observed. Table 5.5 shows their 
general outline. Lays were shortest in the Atlantic, 7 to 9 percent longer in the 
Indian Ocean, and 11 to 14 percent longer in the Pacific and Western Arctic. 
The differentials persisted throughout the period, despite the longer voyages 
to the western grounds and the greater loss rates experienced by barks in the 
Pacific and by all vessels in the Western Arctic. 
The explanation of these persistent interground differences is far from obvi- 
ous, but an attempt is made to provide one below. Here we are interested in 
their effects on the trends in lays noted in Hohman’s analysis. Part of the length- 
ening in the average seaman’s lay resulted from the redistribution of the fleet 
from the short-lay Atlantic and Indian grounds to the long-lay Pacific and West- 
ern Arctic. Between 1840 and 1843, 6 percent of the labor contracts were for 
voyages to the Atlantic and 27  percent for voyages to the Indian Ocean. By 
1855-58  the Atlantic’s share had declined to 4 and the Indian’s to 13 percent. 
Between  1840 and 1858 about 15 percent of the observed lengthening in the 
average lay of a skilled seaman can be attributed to geographic redistribution. 168  Chapter 5 
Table 5.3  Average Lays by Occupation,  All Grounds, New Bedford Whaling 
Voyages, Sailing Years 1840-58  and 1866 
~~  ~  ~~  ~~ 
Fourth  Misc. 
Year  Mate  N  Shipkeeper  N  Blacksmith  N  Artisan8  N  Boy  N 
1840  82.5  2 
1841  75.9  8 
1842  73.1  8 
1843  74.0  12 
1844  73.1  17 
1845  78.1  17 
1846  76.4  20 
1847  73.2  12 
1848  75.4  20 
1849  68.0  7 
1850  70.6  21 
1851  72.3  33 
1852  69.8  17 
1853  12.9  17 
1854  70.5  19 
1855  67.7  22 
1856  63.9  21 
1857  67.7  24 
1858  70.2  12 
1866  68.8  14 






















2  146.3  4  151.7  3 
4  156.4  20  155.0  4 
5  157.5  27  152.9  12 
9  163.3  23  159.2  6 
7  158.6  33  166.3  4 
4  175.9  16  163.3  3 
4  165.6  26  181.0  7 
3  164.8  30  171.4  7 
4  171.7  29  175.7  7 
3  166.9  26  160.0  7 
3  175.3  35  155.8  10 
6  176.2  64  176.9  21 
4  177.2  29  168.8  4 
3  177.7  37  180.0  5 
11  171.4  43  177.1  7 
2  182.1  38  155.0  7 
4  181.6  30  180.6  8 
5  179.0  39  177.5  2 
1  184.5  19  190.0  1 
3  189.1  17  224.0  5 
172.5  170.2 
223.8  12 
235.2  29 
228.4  32 
400.8  33 
338.7  55 
219.7  34 
562.4  37 
463.5  33 
391.3  45 
225.6  24 
307.5  42 
396.8  34 
226.7  18 
254.7  32 
254.5  28 
237.3  42 
248.9  46 
254.7  37 
247.6  34 
280.7  21 
308.7 
Source: Stations and Lays Data Set. 
Notes: The table excludes crewmen who signed on in more than one capacity, and those who 
signed on after the beginning of the voyage. The averages in this table are comparable to those in 
the “All Grounds” column of table 5.2. 
”Miscellaneous artisan includes second coopers, second carpenters, sailmakers, boatbuilders, sec- 
ond blacksmiths, painters, caulkers, and coppersmiths. 
The shortening in officers’ lays is remarkable and probably reflects the in- 
creased supervisory responsibilities of officers associated with the new techno- 
logical configuration. 
5.2  The Wages of Whalemen 
The lay was only a means to an end: the real wage. A crewman’s interest 
centered on the money his lay commanded. An attempt to estimate the wage 
raises two sets of problems-neither  trivial. First, although the main compo- 
nent of a whaleman’s compensation package came from the sale of his share 
of the catch, the value of the lay was not identical to his total income. There 
were both charges and supplements. Also, significant issues are raised by ques- 
tions of the timing of the payment and of income in kind. Second, even if 
adjustments can be made to compensate for these aspects of the bargain, there 
remain questions about the appropriate definition of the wage. 169  Labor 
Table 5.4  Average Lays by Occupation, All Grounds, New Bedford Whaling 
Voyages, Sailing Years 1840-58  and 1866 
Average  % of Value  Relative  % Change in Lay, 























































































14.  I 
8.0 
7.7 
-  12.9 
Source: Stations and Lays Data Set. 
Note: The table excludes crewmen who signed on in more than one capacity, and those who did 
not sail with the vessel. 
Wnskilled seaman equals 100. 
bA shortening lay is indicated here by  a negative sign. A shorter lay means a smaller denominator 
in the lay fraction, and thus a larger portion of the catch. 
In terms of charges, aside from the repayment of cash and the value of cloth- 
ing advanced before and during the voyage and a small charge for the “doctor’s 
box,” a crewman’s wages, as previously noted, were routinely docked for his 
share of  certain  expenses incurred  by  the  vessel. Before  midcentury  these 
charges were small; Hohman to the contrary notwithstanding, they did not sig- 
nificantly affect the final settlement. For example, on nine voyages made by 
four vessels between  1827 and  1850, standard charges reduced  the average 
crewman’s final payment by less than 0.6 percent.*’ 
By the 1850s the industry’s structure had become more complex. Destina- 
23. The average encompasses two voyages of the Stephania (1828-29  and 1829-30), two voy- 
ages of the Midas (1827-29  and 1829-30),  one voyage of the William Rotch (1830-31).  and four 
voyages of the George Howland (1834-38,  1838-41,1842-45,  and 1846-50).  See Account Book 
of the Stephania, 1828-30,  Account Book of the Midas, and Account Book of the William Rorch, 
1830-31, in the Coggeshall Collection; George Huwland Account Book. 170  Chapter 5 
The outfits of whaling vessels included barrel staves, heads, and hoops, from which the 
cooper built barrels and casks as needed to hold the oil tryed out by the crew. These 
drawings come from the sketchbook of a crew member on the Orruy Tuff. 
Reproduced courtesy of The  Kendall Whaling  Museum,  Sharon, Massachusetts, 
U.S.A. 
tions were farther from New  Bedford,  and  the time  spent reaching and re- 
turning from them was costly. In order to overcome their vessels’ capacity con- 
straints and to use their capital more efficiently, agents began to order their 
captains to transship a part of the catch through ports such as Lahaina and, if 
the vessel was not full when it began the homeward trek, to purchase or arrange 
to  transport  additional  cargo.  Transshipments  involved  commissions  and 
freight charges, and crewmen were required to bear their share. On the other 
hand, they were credited with the interest earned on the income generated by 
the sale of transshipped products from the date of their sale to the date of the 
vessel’s return. Similarly, oil and bone purchased to top off a cargo were not 
costless, but they were expected to produce a net gain for both owner and crew. 
As a result of  these  institutional changes, by  the  1850s the charges against 
gross revenues had increased. On four voyages returning after  1850, for ex- 
ample, such charges  were  about  3 percent  of  the  average  crewman’s gross 
During the Civil War, the threat of Confederate raiders drove insurance and 
freight charges to new heights. On a voyage of the George Howland that de- 
parted New Bedford in 1862 and returned in 1866, the charges totaled $28,316 
(including $13,263 for freight, $9,143 for insurance, and $5,032 in commis- 
24.  The average encompasses one voyage of the Benjamin Tucker (1 849-5  1  j and three voyages 
of  the  George Howland  (ISSO-52, 1852-57, and  1857-61). See Benjamin  Tucker, 1849-51; 
George Howland Account Book. 171  Labor 
Table 5.5  Relative Lays by Occupation and Ground, New Bedford Whaling 
Voyages, Sailing Years 1840-58  and 1866 (Atlantic = 100) 
1849-58and1866 
1840-58  and 1866 
Western 
Occupation  Indian  Pacific  Indian  Pacific  Arctic" 
Officer 
Captain  109  109  105  107  107 
First mate  113  11s  107  110  110 
Second mate  113  118  111  114  114 
Third mate  110  112  104  107  107 
Boatsteerer  117  128  11s  124  128 
Cooper  95  93  94  90  92 
Carpenter  110  114  108  112  113 
Cook  109  114  10s  109  112 
Steward  110  113  110  113  116 
Skilled seaman  106  116  106  112  115 
Semi-skilled seaman  108  116  109  113  116 
Unskilled seaman  112  119  110  116  119 





Source: Stations and Lays Data Set. 
Notes: The table excludes crewmen who signed on in more than one capacity, and those who did 
not sail with the vessel. Higher index numbers mean longer relative lays (and therefore smaller 
percentages of  the value of the catch). 
"The Western Arctic was opened for whaling in 1848. 
bThese  are unweighted averages. 
sions), or more than 15 percent of gross revenues-but  the voyage was still a 
financial  success. Despite  the record charges, the monthly  net revenues  (in 
constant dollars) were more than one-half again as high as the average earned 
on the ship's previous seven voyages and almost 10 percent greater than on the 
most successful of the seven (George Howlund Account Book). Not all vessels 
that put to sea during the war incurred such heavy charges, On the bark Cal- 
luo's  1,093-day voyage from September  1862 to August  1865, after adjust- 
ments  for  the  interest  accrued  on  transshipped  products,  the  net  charges 
amounted to only about 1.6 percent of revenues. 
After the war, charges settled back into the range of the 1850s. On one voy- 
age of  the bark Cullao and four of the ship Milton, such offsets against wages 
averaged 4.4 percent. They rose significantly above that level only when a mis- 
adventure near the end of a voyage forced the owners to pay freight charges on 
cargo that would otherwise have been brought back by the vessel itself.  On 
the last voyage of the Culluo-condemned  in Mauritius in 1877-the  charges 
totaled 28.6 percent; on the last voyage of  the Milton-"arrived  Panama in 172  Chapter5 
distress” in  1889-they  amounted to  12.9 percent. In the latter case, if the 
Panama freight charges had not been incurred, the total would have been only 
5.1 percent (Milton and Calla0 Account Books). 
In partial offset to these charges, some whalemen earned supplements to 
their contracted lays. A captain usually received a fraction of the profits from 
the sales of clothing and tobacco from the slop chest, and sometimes a share 
of the slush fund; he also often carried on subsidiary commercial enterprises 
on his own  The cook was normally entitled to some fraction of the 
slush.26  From time to time seamen received not insubstantial bonuses for par- 
ticularly good performances in sighting and catching whales. On the 1834 voy- 
age of the George Howland, for example, four seamen received cash bonuses 
ranging from $30 to $50-sums  equal to between 7.5 and 12.5 percent of their 
lay incomes.*’ Also,  a crew member might be the recipient of  some of  the 
traditional charges that provided the wedge between gross and net value. He 
might add to his earnings by helping load the vessel before it set out to sea, 
helping unload or clean it when it returned to port, or forgoing shore leave on 
an exotic South Sea island to remain aboard ship as a watchman. 
Finally, although it is impossible to assess the extent of the practice, lays 
were  sometimes renegotiated  during a voyage. In  1860 the agent  Matthew 
Howland wrote to Captain Valentine Lewis (1  8 July, Howland Collection), 
who had reported that his crew were asking to have their lays increased. How- 
land told Lewis to resist if he could, but to accede if necessary, “because we 
are satisfied that a good crew is cheaper at high lays than a miserable crew is 
for nothing.” On the George Howland‘s eighth voyage (1862-66),  seven crew- 
men (the third mate, the cooper, the steward, three boatsteerers, and a seaman) 
received increases in lays whose value ranged from $140.39 to $1,936.90 and 
totaled $5,557.98 (George Howland Account Book). 
Two other characteristics of the wage bargain tempered the amount of risk 
transferred from owner to seaman. First, the seaman received room (or at least 
a bunk or a place to hang his hammock) and board (such as it was). In 1880 
dollars the value of  a crewman’s food probably  ranged  between  $3.90 and 
$6.70 a month.28 
25. On seven of the eight voyages made by  the George Howland between  1834 and  1866- 
voyages for which we have information (the relevant page on the 1857-61  voyage is missing)- 
the captain’s extra income was, in order, $600.62, $168.45, $1,222.65, $0.00, $621.75, $2,686.10, 
and $775.02.  These amounts average $867.80 per voyage, or $20.91 per month. See George How- 
land Account Book. 
26. Hohman  1928, 231. In sixty-three cook’s contracts out of  the 1,250 voyages represented in 
the Stations and Lays Data Set, the cook’s entitlement to some portion of the slush fund (usually 
one-half) was spelled out. 
27. George Howland Account Book.  Hohman (1928,  219) mentions  bonuses  “for sighting 
whales which were subsequently captured” but characterizes all payments other than the value of 
the lay as “scanty.” 
28. See appendix 5C. The subsistence estimates described therein have been converted to 1880 
dollars using the Warren and Pearson food price index (US.  Department of  Commerce  1975, 
series E-54). 173  Labor 
Second, with the exception  of  the captain and sometimes a mate or two, 
crewmen normally received advances before their vessels left port. Usually the 
advance was between  one-quarter  and  one-third of projected  earnings. The 
funds were used, and were usually sufficient, to support wives, children, or 
parents during the voyage; they  occasionally were supplemented by further 
advances if the voyage proved unusually long or an emergency arose. Crew- 
men were charged interest on advances (usually 6 percent), but advances were 
almost never repaid if the ship sank or returned clean (that is, without oil or 
bone). Moreover, if at the end of a successful voyage a seaman’s account was 
still in deficit, the agent had little recourse but to try to convince him to sign 
on for another of the agent’s voyages. Since the seaman could sign elsewhere 
and have a clean slate, such attempts were seldom successful. 
Over eight voyages of the George Howland (1834-66),  five of the Milton 
(1  869-85),  and two of the Callao (1  87  1-77),  advances were taken by 4 13 of 
the 459 newly signed crewmen. They ranged (in 1880 dollars) from $1,003.25 
($1,043.38 nominal) for the second mate of the George Howland in  1862 to 
$1.32 ($1.45 nominal) for Joseph Howland-a  Howland family member sail- 
ing as an able seaman-of  the same ship in  1838. The average advance was 
$121.66. Over these fifteen voyages, the advances amounted to just less than 
10 percent of net revenues (gross returns less charges) or about 30 percent of 
the crew’s share. On the three voyages that yielded their owners less than $700 
per month, advances averaged 25 percent of total revenue. Finally, the sketchy 
evidence  suggests that  in  the  postbellum  period  individual  advances  were 
somewhat smaller ($1  15 as opposed to $127), but, as a fraction of net revenues, 
the proportion was probably higher (George Howland Account Book; Milton 
and Callao Account Books). 
Advances were a cause of concern among agents and seamen. Agents were 
prepared to accept the losses associated with truly disastrous voyages, but less 
willing to accept those resulting  from desertion. In  September  1834 Charles 
Morgan warned  one of his captains, Cornelius Howland Jr.  (24 September, 
Morgan Collection), “The crew are generally indebted to the Owners about 
$1 10 to $120 each you will therefore be especially careful of them till you get 
Oil enough to secure that and over it.” Five weeks later in a letter to another 
captain (Reuben Russell, 1 November), he was even more explicit: “I think you 
have  a  good  crew, but  they  mostly  all  are  in  debt  to  the  Ship from $70 
to  $100-So  please  take  care they  dont run  away  before  you  get  some 
Sperm Oil.” 
On the outbound voyage crewmen had  a strong incentive to desert; some 
managed to run even before their vessels left New Bedford. On the return voy- 
age the incentive shifted. It was then that the captain, and perhaps the agent, 
found it in his interest to convince a crewman to make an early departure. In 
November  1836, eleven months after the Condor left New Bedford and three 
months before she was scheduled to return, Morgan wrote Captain George H. 
Dexter (21 November, Morgan Collection), “The carpenter too has come and 174  Chapter 5 
tells a queer story of his being left purposely of the whole crew being without 
bread nine days and some other things equally probable. I did not pay much 
attention to him.” 
That captains and agents tended to ease the path to desertion when a crew- 
man’s account stood in surplus was the view of U.S. Navy lieutenant Charles 
Wilkes, who commanded  an expedition to the Pacific in the late  1830s and 
early  1840s. “Many Americans are found on the different islands, who have 
been turned ashore from whale-ships, or left because they have broken their 
liberty a single time, near the end of a voyage. Such treatment leaves too much 
ground  [not] to believe that they are purposely  left, in order to increase the 
profits of the ship-master or owners” (Wilkes 1845, 5:498). For example, dur- 
ing the Montreal’s third voyage (1857-62),  the vessel left five crewmen, and 
“the evidence seems to imply clearly that . . .  the ship deserted the men, rather 
than vice versa!” (Hohman 1928,67). 
The historian A. B. C. Whipple charges that obstreperous men were often 
marooned on uninhabited islands and left to die. He describes in some detail 
the problems U.S. consuls faced in adjudicating between captain and men- 
did the men desert or were they marooned? In one case the consul found an 
obvious answer. In the early  1830s Captain Brown of the Warren, Rhode Is- 
land, brig Magnet wrote to the consul at Callao, Peru, concerning crewmen 
whom he wanted the consul to return to the vessel: “I should be happy if you 
will have the goodness to git the men down as soon as convenient. . . .  I have 
no one I can trust out of my ship or I would send someone up” (Whipple 1954, 
132). It is interesting that Brown remained captain on the next voyage of the 
Magnet. Clearly the agent, Joseph Smith Jr. (his father had been the agent for 
the previous voyage), was not displeased with the captain’s contribution to his 
crew’s desertion. In the same vein, on the 1855-59  voyage of the Alice Fraziel; 
Captain C. M. Newel1 twice (in January  1857 and November 1857) reported 
that his crew had mutinied. The first time he had the entire crew imprisoned in 
Paita and shipped a new crew; the second time, one mutineer was killed and 
his accomplices were put ashore (WSL 17 February 1857, 19 January 1858). 
It is impossible to be sure who won this game, but it was probably the crew- 
men. Support for this view can be found in the eight voyages of the George 
Howland between December 1834 and April 1886. In 1880 dollars the average 
advances ranged from $77 to $157 per crewman over these voyages (the mean 
was $1  12). Over the same voyages the average total income that accrued to the 
agents and owners from crewmen who deserted or were discharged for cause 
(i.e., the income represented by these crewmen’s lay shares less their advances) 
ranged from a loss of $3,732 to a gain of $7,966 and averaged a gain of $747- 
just less than one-fourth of the average total amount advanced. That the aver- 
age is a gain depends, however, entirely on the seventh voyage (October 1857 
to July 1861). Over the other seven the average loss to the agents and owners 
was $284, or about 8 percent of the average amount advanced. The seventh 
voyage began during the depression of  1857 and was marked by  an average 175  Labor 
advance of only $77-well  below the overall mean of $1 12, and $21 less than 
the average for the most parsimonious of the seven other voyages. 
Since there is no systematic evidence on supplements, charges, advances, or 
renegotiations, the unadjusted lay payment (the initial lay times the value of 
the catch) has been taken as an approximation to, and an index of, the earnings 
of  the mid-nineteenth-century  whaleman.  For certain wage comparisons  an 
estimate of the value of board has been added to that figure. Questions remain, 
nonetheless, about an appropriate definition of the wage. Voyages in the Sta- 
tions and Lays Data Set were not short. They ranged in length from a three- 
month venture into the Atlantic by the Petrel in 1866 to the sixty-nine-month 
voyages to the Pacific by the George in  1847 and the Courier in 1850. Con- 
tracts were signed before voyages began, and payment was not due until vessels 
returned to New Bedford. Often a substantial fraction of the original crew did 
not return with the vessel. 
Table 5.6  provides one wage schedule, reporting the earnings that whalemen 
would have received from lays had they returned on the vessels on which they 
departed. This is probably the best available ex post measure. It omits charges 
against and supplements to lay income, but lay income was the bulk of earnings 
in any case.2y 
5.3  The Relative Wages of Whalemen 
The absolute level of wages was certainly a concern of whalemen, and re- 
mains of  interest to social historians looking into questions of  welfare, but 
relative wages dictated career choices and governed the flow of men into the 
industry. It is the latter measure that is of greater interest to economic historians 
analyzing the efficiency  of  nineteenth-century  labor markets. Wages ashore 
are one standard against which to measure whalemen’s earnings; the merchant 
marine, at least at first glance, would seem to provide more relevant compari- 
29. Wage estimates based on the earnings that the  crewman would have received from his lay 
share, had he returned on the vessel on which he departed, can be called an Own Vessel measure. 
An alternate measure, Own Ground, is based on the average eventual value of the catch of  all 
vessels sailing to a particular ground in the year that the crewman put to sea. Although orders were 
sometimes changed, most agents had chosen the general area to be hunted before the crew was 
signed. To  the extent that agents possessed good intelligence, the Own Ground figure would be 
the agent’s estimate of the potential labor cost of a voyage. 
There is good reason to believe that New Bedford residents knew something about the current 
productivity of  each of  the various grounds, but, if  these wage estimates are to be  viewed as 
relevant to ex ante decisions, one must assume that agents and crewmen believed they could assess 
grounds’ future productivity. For agents, who appear to have been continually in contact with their 
captains and with merchants throughout the world, this assumption may not overly distort reality. 
For crewmen the assumption is much less obviously plausible. In an attempt to capture the infor- 
mation that would have been available to a seaman or  agent before a contract was signed, a third 
estimate, Own Year, was calculated. It is based on the average catch of vessels returning to New 
Bedford from a ground in the year the crewman sailed to it. It seems reasonable to assume that 
the expectations of crewmen and agents were largely based on this evidence, and, therefore, a 
wage estimate based on it is the best ex ante estimate available. The interground wage regressions 
reported in table 5.1  1 are based on the Own Year estimates. Table 5.6  Average Monthly Earnings by Occupation, All Grounds, New 
Bedford Whaling Voyages, Sailing Years 1840-58  and 1866 
(current dollars) 
First  Second  Third 
Year  Captain  Mate  Mate  Mate  Boatsteerer  Cooper 
1840  88.75 
1841  70.05 
1842  78.18 
1843  83.19 
1844  70.43 
1845  66.63 
1846  85.77 
1847  83.38 
1848  106.09 
1849  112.60 
1850  114.12 
1851  119.93 
1852  113.11 
1853  121.31 
1854  116.07 
1855  97.72 
1856  108.68 
1857  90.48 
1858  104.48 
1866  133.01 
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10.35  10.59  11.13  10.44 
8.03  8.71  9.00  8.38 
8.43  9.67  9.73  9.65 
9.05  9.79  10.05  9.93 
6.79  8.13  8.31  8.00 
7.03  7.67  7.88  7.18 
8.39  9.80  10.02  9.92 
7.98  9.43  10.01  8.76 
11.16  12.03  11.88  11.74 
12.16  13.27  12.82  12.50 
10.57  11.88  11.96  11.87 
11.16  12.92  13.69  11.67 
10.32  12.39  14.91  11.51 
12.30  12.73  13.88  11.38 
10.98  12.21  13.17  14.24 
8.67  9.34  10.95  9.40 
8.64  10.23  10.98  10.23 
7.52  9.02  9.80  7.42 
8.77  10.18  10.31  9.42 
11.20  12.16  15.85  11.22 
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Table 5.6  (continued) 
Sources: Catch data and the durations of voyages came from the Voyages Data Set, prices from 
the Prices Data Set, lays from the Stations and Lays Data Set. 
Notes:  Lays were set when a vessel sailed, but the value of its catch (and the length of its voyage) 
couldn’t be determined until it returned. The voyages whose crews’ earnings are reported in this 
table began in the years 1840-58 and 1866; they ended in the years 1840-63 and 1866-7 1. 
The average monthly value of the catch of a voyage was computed by dividing the value of its 
catch by the number of months it was at sea. Monthly earnings were computed by multiplying this 
value by the lay fraction. 
These wages assume crewmen returned on the vessels on which they sailed. A crewman who 
left a voyage before its end often received his lay fraction of the catch to that date (not its value). 
The number of  observations averaged to produce each figure in this table is equal to or less than 
the number of lays averaged to produce the figures in table 5.2. When the value of the catch of a 
voyage could not be determined, the wages of its crewmen could not be calculated. 
”These are unweighted averages. 
sons. Maritime data are spotty, but the work of Stanley Lebergott (1964,53  1- 
38, tables A-22A, A-22B) provides bases for comparison for six of the twelve 
major whaling occ~pations.~~ 
During the  1840s and  1850s officers in  the  whaling fleet were  well re- 
warded, if their alternative was service in the merchant marine. Over compar- 
able years, whaling captains received, on average, $90.33 per month, captains 
in the merchant service, only $29.54 (see table 5.7). First and second mates on 
whalers earned roughly twice as much as those on merchantmen. A part of the 
whaling premium almost certainly reflected the uncertainty of  rewards. For 
merchant captains the range of  salaries was from $20 to $35 per month; the 
lucky whaling captains who returned with some catch earned monthly salaries 
that ranged from $0.66 to $345.34. For first mates the mercantile range was 
$45 ($15 to $60) in contrast to $234 for whalemen, and for second mates the 
ranges were $36 and $121, re~pectively.~’ 
In whaling, officers were required not only to assume larger risks, but also 
to bear heavier responsibilities. Since they often hunted in uncharted waters, it 
was necessary that they possess maritime skills greater than those of officers 
in the merchant fleet. The extent of the navigational hazards is acknowledged 
by  the  WSL. Of  the loss of  twelve whalers in the North Pacific in  1851, it 
reported, “The losses are attributed to the incorrectness of  the charts of  the 
Northern Seas, unknown currents, ice, and an unusual prevalence of  severe 
gales and foggy weather through the summer of  185  1” (13 January 1852).  The 
30. Lebergott’s  data are drawn from the manuscript collections of  Baker Library, Graduate 
School of Business Administration, Harvard University, and of the Essex Institute in Salem, Mas- 
sachusetts. His evidence does not include complete enumerations of the wages of all crewmen. 
Thus, for the years 1840-58  and 1866, there are records of eighty-three voyages, wage data for 
able seamen for eighty-two, captains’ wages for only thirty-four, first mates’ wages for fifty-nine, 
and cooks’ wages for sixty-three. 
31. The fact that the highest first mate’s wage in the merchant marine was $60 while the best- 
paid merchant captain received only $35 does not  mean that on a given voyage the first mate 
earned more than the captain. The ostensible anomaly comes from the spotty nature of the data. 
The voyage data that yielded the highly paid mate does not include the wage of his captain. 178  Chapter 5 
Table 5.7  Ratio of Average Monthly Wages on New Bedford Whalers to Wages 
on U.S. Merchantmen, by Occupation, Sailing Years 1840-58  and 
1866 (current dollars) 
First  Second  Skilled  Semi-skilled 
Year  Captain  Mate  Mate  Cook  Seaman  Seaman 
1840  2.96  2.04  1.68  0.77  0.73  - 
1841  2.34  2.08  -  0.89  0.60  - 
1842  2.6 1  2.44  -  0.97  0.67  - 
1843  2.77  2.82  -  1.18  0.76  - 
1844  2.56  2.31  -  0.96  0.60  - 
1845  2.50  2.24  -  0.69  0.53  - 
1846  3.06  2.88  1.78  0.79  0.69  0.85 
1847  3.34  1.63  1.51  0.47  0.56  - 
1848  3.54  3.03  2.16  0.99  0.77  0.9 1 
1849  -  2.48  -  0.88  1.04  - 
1850  4.18  4.38  -  0.91  0.77  - 
1851  -  2.62  2.49  0.78  0.82  1.04 
1852  -  2.75  2.30  0.72  0.79  0.90 
1853  3.47  3.36  2.48  0.85  0.76  1.12 
1854  3.32  1.85  1.48  0.45  0.79  0.75 
1855  -  -  1.06  0.36  0.63  0.68 
-  -  -  -  0.5 1  -  1856 
1857  -  1.32  1.11  0.36  0.49  - 
1858 
1866  -  1.61  1.60  0.41  0.42  0.53 
Meansa  3.05  2.46  1.79  0.75  0.68  0.85 
-  -  -  -  -  - 
Sources: For the wages of whaling crewmen, see table 5.2 and table 5.6 notes. For the wages of 
merchant seamen, see Lebergott 1964, 531-38,  tables A-22A, A-22B. 
Notes: Blank cells are missing data for wages of  merchant seamen. The wage  rates on mer- 
chantmen are unweighted averages of all of the observations available in Lebergott  1964, tables 
A-22A, A-22B. There are very few observations, so that small differences in the ratios in this table 
should not be regarded as meaningful. “Skilled” merchant seamen are those described by  Leber- 
gott as “able seamen”; “semi-skilled” merchant seamen are those described as “ordinary seamen.” 
“These  are unweighted averages. 
same point is made by Captain Dunn of the Dragon, commenting on the loss 
of the ship Logan together with one of its boatsteerers and three men: “Sandy 
Island Reef is laid down about 40 miles too far to the Eastward in all the charts 
previous to 1850.”32 
In addition, a whaling captain had to understand the whale’s habits and mi- 
gration patterns and to be prepared to command a Nantucket sleigh-as  the 
whaleboats were sometimes called. The other officers were also required to 
possess  skills beyond those asked of  a mate in the merchant marine. On 27 
32. WSL 6 November 1855. See also Sanger 1991a. 85: “It is obvious . . . that, while certain 
elements either promoted or hindered the whaling operation, a whaling-master’s detailed knowl- 
edge of both long-term and short-term effects of currents, temperatures and winds on the Green- 
land Sea pack ice greatly enhanced his chances of procuring a paying cargo of  oil and bone.” 179  Labor 
August  1834 (Morgan Collection) Charles W. Morgan wrote one of his cap- 
tains, “I have also been thinking  about Officers, who are however plenty- 
There is Mr. Plaskitt who was 3@  Mate on the Russell-if  you went a sperm 
whale voyage I don’t think you could get a better man. I don’t know how he 
would answer for right whaling.” 
It is clear from their letters that agents believed the choice of the captain 
(and probably of the first and second mates, as well) was immensely important 
to the success of a voyage. Evidence that they were not mistaken can be found 
in a quantitative analysis of the returns of voyages. A comprehensive multiple 
regression model-the  dependent variable is a Caves-Christensen-Diewert su- 
perlative  productivity  index, and  the  independent  variables  are designed  to 
capture decision, technological, and environmental factors that theory or con- 
temporary accounts suggest may have been determinants of productivity-fit 
to the data on individual voyages shows that productivity was positively associ- 
ated (large coefficient, high significance level) with the captain’s share of out- 
put (see chapters 8 and  10). In addition, the large lays awarded captains and 
other officers certainly support the imputation of high productivity to them. 
If greater risk and increased knowledge  and skill requirements  led to the 
relatively high wages earned by officers, what explains the wages of cooks and 
seamen? Wages in whaling were not higher than those in the merchant service; 
they were lower. Over comparable periods the ratio of earnings in whaling to 
earnings in the merchant marine ranged from 0.68 for skilled seamen to 0.75 
for cooks to 0.85 for semi-skilled seamen. In only four of the forty-five occupa- 
tion years for which there are comparable data was the ratio equal to or greater 
than 1.0. 
These relatively low wages were coupled with great variation. The ranges in 
the merchant marine fell between  1 to 3 and  1 to 4 ($10 to $30 for skilled 
seamen, and $7 to $30 for cooks); the ranges for the comparable whalemen 
were many times as wide. For cooks, monthly wages ranged from $0.55 to 
$35.14 (1 to 53),  for semi-skilled seamen from $0.48 to $29.95 (1 to 62), and 
for skilled seamen from $0.16 to $49.24 (1 to 308). 
Merchant  seamen “professed  great contempt for ‘spouters’  and  ‘blubber- 
hunters’; and a real whaleman never thought of shifting his allegiance.” Each 
industry drew from its own pool of labor, and only when both were working 
to capacity was there “competition for those hands who were willing to ship 
in either service” (Hohman 1928,239  n. 12). Also, both whaling and merchant 
marine agents were able to draw from an international labor pool. According 
to Stanley Lebergott (1964, 26), “in the mid-1840s many believed that two- 
thirds of our sailors were not native.” In November  1864 the Honolulu Friend 
reported:  “In our visits among the [whale] shipping, we see there has been a 
great change in the character of the crews. Formerly there was a majority of 
American and European seamen, while now the crews are largely made up of 
Hawaiians, and other Polynesians. Not a few are from Guam. Portuguese sea- 
men still abound. It is rare, indeed, to meet with a full crew of Americans. It 180  Chapter5 
is not always that the officers are all Americans.  The war, and the demand 
for labor, have drawn away a large proportion of American seamen” (WSL 17 
January 1865). 
The makeup of the typical whaling crew (and the difficulty of determining 
a yardstick against which to measure their wages) is neatly captured in Charles 
Nordhoff‘s  account  (1895,  46-47)  of  the  crew of  the whaler  on which  he 
shipped: 
The captain, two mates, and three of the boatsteerers were Americans. The 
third mate, and one of the boatsteerers were Portuguese, natives of Fayal, as 
were also four of our crew. . . . The rest of the crew I find enumerated in my 
log, as follows: two lawyer’s clerks, one professional gambler, one runaway 
from his  father’s counting house in New York, (this was also an amateur 
gambler), one New York “butcher-boy”-his  name was Mose-six  factory 
hands, from some small New England towns, one Boston  school boy, one 
canal-boat  man, six farm boys-from  various parts of New England, and 
western  New  York,-the  four  Portuguese  before  mentioned,  who  were 
whalemen, and the writer hereof, who wrote himself seaman. 
Nordhoff describes a time when the whaling industry had shrunk substantially. 
In the 1840s and  1850s, when the industry  was at its peak,  the fraction of 
foreigners in a typical crew would have been larger. 
The comparison of the wages of whalemen (excluding officers) with those 
of merchant seamen produces results that, if they do not confirm the view that 
there  were  two  separate  labor markets,  imply  behavior  outside  the normal 
bounds of economists’ assumptions. If the positions in whaling and in the mer- 
chant service were really comparable, and if both industries had access to the 
same workers, the whalemen’s willingness to accept both lower average and 
much more variable returns would suggest either that whalemen were drawn 
from an unusual group-people  who believed that a small probability of a big 
win was a goal worth sacrificing for-or  that they were paying apprenticeship 
dues on the way to more remunerative positions as boatsteerers or officers. It 
is more likely that the two groups were being hired for different jobs: merchant 
seamen  as  seamen, whalemen  as oarsmen.  It  is also possible  that  the  two 
groups were doing the same job, but that the whalemen were not very good at 
it. The evidence indicates that there is an element of  truth in each of the four 
explanations; it is not possible to assign them relative weights. 
The merchant marine may have been the closest maritime alternative for a 
whaleman, but it was shore-based opportunities that forced captains and agents 
to look to foreign ports for crews. Table 5.8 shows the trend in relative whaling- 
to-onshore wage rates for nine professional and skilled classes of  whalemen 
and for the three classes of seamen. The relative positions of all officers vis-8- 
vis  shore-based  artisans improved by  19 percent or more between  1840-43 
and 1853-56. For the other skilled whalemen the story is less favorable. Their 
relative positions did not deteriorate (in fact, they may have improved some- 
what), but carpenters, cooks, and stewards all earned less than one-half, boat- Table 5.8  Relative Average Monthly Wages, Ashore and on New Bedford Whalers, by Occupation, Sailing Years 1840-56  (current dollars) 
A. Ratio to Northeastern Artisans (= 100) 
First  Second  Third 
Year  Captain  Mate  Mate  Mate  Boatsteerer  Cooper  Carpenter  Cook  Steward 
1840  248  153  97  76  57  80  39  39  41 
1841  197  128  86  64  47  67  31  33  34 
1842  238  159  99  80  57  78  34  38  38 
1843  236  153  97  70  52  72  33  35  36 
1844  226  142  95  67  50  70  30  34  35 
1845  181  120  76  60  41  62  27  29  29 
1846  239  157  100  78  53  74  32  35  36 
1847  230  142  94  72  52  74  31  35  37 
1848  307  197  131  90  64  96  41  43  43 
1849  323  217  136  96  68  96  44  47  46 
1850  324  22 1  136  94  64  104  39  42  42 
1851  345  244  149  109  68  110  41  46  48 
1852  316  219  135  102  66  98  38  44  51 
1853  328  236  140  105  69  100  43  44  47 
1854  295  220  I32  97  64  90  38  41  44 
1855  238  171  104  77  49  72  32  33  37 
1856  235  162  99  72  46  71  28  31  33 
Means  265  179  112  83  57  83  35  38  40 
Ratios of  relative wages, 
1853-56  to 1840-43  1.19  1.33  1.25  I .20  1.08  1.12  1.03  1.03  1.08 
(continued) Table 5.8  (continued) 
B. Ratio of  Skilled Seamen to 
Unskilled Northeast  New England Textile  Unskilled Factory  Common Laborers 
Year  (= 100)  (=  100)  (= 100)  (= 100) 
1840  81  102  91  67 
1841  54  85  76  59 
1842  51  89  75  62 
1843  52  96  80  68 
1844  44  17  68  48 
1845  42  13  68  47 
I846  52  89  80  62 
1847  60  82  75  61 
1848  66  96  87  12 
1849  63  104  86  71 
1850  59  95  16  66 
1851  61  96  80  65 
1852  56  99  81  65 
1853  51  97  80  65 
1854  67  121  97  17 
1855  50  92  73  59 
1856  49  94  70  60 
Means  57  93  79  63 
Ratios of relative wages, 1853-56  to 1840-43  .92  1.09  .99  I .02 
C. Ratio of Semi-skilled Seamen to 
Yea 
Unskilled Northeast  New England Textile  Unskilled Factory  Common Laborers 































































































D. Ratio of Unskilled Seamen to 
Year 
~  ~  ~  -~ 
Unskilled Northeast  New England Textile  Unskilled Factory  Common Laborers 




































(continued) Table 5.8  (continued) 
Year 
Unskilled Northeast  New England Textile  Unskilled Factory  Common Laborers 





























































Sources: Panel A “Northeastern Artisans”: Margo and Villaflor  1987, 893, table 5. Panels B, C, and D “Unskilled Northeast”: Margo and Villaflor 1987, 894, table 
6; “New England Textile”: Layer 1955, 24-26,  table 6, col. a; “Unskilled Factory”: Abbott 1905,363, table 8; “Common Laborers”: Abbott 1905, 364, table 11. 
Notes: The average monthly value of the catch of a voyage was computed by dividing the value of its catch by  the number of  months it was at sea. Monthly earnings 
were computed by multiplying this value by the lay fraction. The estimates assume the crewman returned on the vessel on whch he sailed. Catch data and the durations 
of voyages came from the Voyages Data Set, prices from the Prices Data Set, lays from the Stations and Lays Data Set. 
In this table the wages of  crewmen incorporate estimates of subsistence. We used the lower-bound estimate described in appendix 5C. 
All of the other wage series underlying this table are given, in their sources, in the form of daily wage rates. We converted them to estimates of monthly wages by 
multiplying them by 25, a rough estimate of the average number of  work days in a month, across the year. Whether this conversion results in figures fully comparable 
to the crewmen’s incomes is an open question. While afloat, whaling crewmen were always on call, but, since the whalers contained many more men than were needed 
to sail them, seamen often had nothing to do; boredom was apparently a big  problem. In the presence of  whales, however, crews worked long hours filled with 
intense labor. 185  Labor 
Table 5.9  Percentage Changes in Average Monthly Wages of New Bedford 





















































Note: The periods 1840-43  and 1855-58  are spans of sailing years 
’See table 5.6 notes. 
bThe  price index used to derive variant  I  is drawn from Williamson and Lindert 1980, 319. Very 
similar results are obtained with the Warren and Pearson “All Commodities” wholesale price index 
(US.  Department of Commerce 1975, series E-52). 
‘The index used to derive variant 2 comes from David and Solar 1977, 19. 
steerers only three-fifths,  and even coopers less than nine-tenths  as much as 
Margo and Villaflor’s artisans. 
The situation of seamen was no better. The wages of  skilled, semi-skilled, 
and  unskilled  seamen  were  less than  60 percent  of  the  wages  of  workers 
ashore. If the basis of comparison is shifted either to Edith Abbott’s estimates 
for skilled factory workers or to her estimates for common laborers, the relative 
position  of  whalemen  improves; but even skilled seamen received  less than 
shore-based workers. All three classes of  seamen earned about  as much  as 
Massachusetts textile workers.33  It is unfortunate that the estimates of whaling 
earnings cannot be extended back to the 1820s and 1830s. The secondary liter- 
ature indicates that, in those early decades, whaling’s workforce  was largely 
American (i.e., men whose fathers had been born on this side of the Atlantic- 
including not insubstantial numbers of blacks and Native Americans), and the 
majority were trained seamen.34  The relative circumstances of  these workers 
may have been better. 
Table 5.9 compares changes in nominal and real wages for whalemen be- 
tween the beginning of the 1840s and the end of the 1850s. Between 1840-43 
and 1855-58 the real wages of unskilled workers in the United States may have 
33. Most textile workers were women, but it appears that women did not receive substantially 
34. Hohman 1928, 51-52.  See also the discussion of relative wages in chapter 8 below. 
lower wages than men in this industry (Layer 1955,51). 186  Chapter 5 
risen by as much as 29 percent or fallen by as much as 7 percent; a precise 
answer depends on the wage series and price deflator chosen. No matter what 
price index is chosen, the real wages of enlisted whalemen declined by more 
than any of the onshore estimates.35  Officers, on the other hand, clearly gained. 
It is difficult to see how, given these wage differentials, the whaling industry 
could have continued to recruit trained Americans for enlisted jobs over the 
two antebellum decades. The probable explanation is that it did not. Instead, 
agents turned more and more to unskilled Americans and to both skilled and 
unskilled foreigners. Even black sailors-whose  onshore opportunities must 
have been severely constrained-seem  to have deserted the whaling fleet. At 
least it appears that the proportion of native blacks in the typical  crew de- 
~lined.’~ 
Other interpretations are possible. The industry might have been  such an 
unusual opportunity for risk lovers that wages shrank as gamblers competed 
for a limited number of jobs. The presence of both professional and amateur 
gamblers among Nordhoff‘s shipmates (1  895,46-47) may indicate something 
about the degree of risk aversion shared by at least the American component 
of that crew. As Hohman (1928,239 n. 12) argues, “The device of the lay, with 
its  tantalizing possibility  of  a  lucky  voyage, served to obscure  the average 
earnings.” 
The data on wages indicate that within the industry the labor market worked 
as well as could be expected (see table 5.10): higher wages were paid in ex- 
panding hunting grounds. Its efficiency may be judged from an analysis of the 
contracts of  12,646 greenhands who departed New Bedford over the twenty 
years  1840-58  and 1866 (greenhands  because perceived  quality differences 
were probably  smaller among them than among  seamen with  more experi- 
ence). For the neophytes the real monthly wage averaged $8.34 in 1880 dollars, 
but there were interground differentials. Lays in the Atlantic averaged  1/159 
(.00633),  those  in  the  Indian  1/178  (.00562),  those  in  the  Pacific  1/189 
(.00529), and those in the Western Arctic 1/195 (.00513). Differences in pro- 
ductivity reversed  this ranking. Greenhands  who signed on for the Atlantic 
earned, on average, only $6.17 a month-less  than the $7.31 average for the 
Indian Ocean, the $8.59 for the Pacific, and the $9.87 for the Western 
35. The change in real unskilled wages using the Warren and Pearson “All Commodities” whole- 
sale price index as a deflator was 6.8 percent for Margo and Villaflor’s unskilled workers (1987, 
894) and -5.3  percent for Abbott’s “All Unskilled“ (1905, 363). The changes for the same two 
series using the Williamson and Lindert consumer price deflator (1980) were 3.3  percent and -7.3 
percent, respectively. Using the implied David and Solar deflator (1977) the changes were 29.2 
percent and 11.2 percent. 
36. Hobman 1928, 50-51.  Martha Putney’s survey (1987, 125) of crew lists indicates that there 
were, on average, 2.8 blacks on each New Bedford vessel sailing between 1803 and 1840, but only 
1.9 in  the years  1841-43  and  1.1 in  1846-60.  Unfortunately, it is impossible to  tell  from her 
account whether the  vessels involved are only whalers, or  both whalers and merchant vessels. 
Putney’s definitions of  her numerator and denominator may  also have differed from period  to 
period. 
37. These averages are the estimated earnings of a greenhand who returned on the vessel on 
which he sailed (Own Vessel). They are not comparable to the dependent means in the regressions 187  Labor 
Table 5.10  Relative Average Monthly Wages of New Bedford Whaling Crewmen, 
by Occupation and Ground, Sailing Years 1840-58  and 1866 
(Atlantic = 100) 
Occupation 
Western 



















































1  60 
168 
Sources: Stations and Lays, Voyages, and Prices data sets. For the computation of wages, see table 
5.6 notes. The calculations omit crew members with second occupations and those who signed on 
after the start of the voyage. 
“These  are unweighted averages. 
To aid in understanding the workings of the whaling labor market, we mod- 
eled the wage bargain. Each agent and potential crewman was assumed to be 
aware of  (1) the ground to which the voyage was primarily directed (external 
evidence indicates that the choice of ground was one of the agent’s first deci- 
sions, and he recruited labor in light of that choice;38  also, the labor contract 
usually spelled out the projected ground); (2) the average catch and length of 
voyage of  vessels returning to New Bedford from the chosen ground during 
the previous year, as well as the variability of each of these measures (informa- 
tion readily available in the WSL);  and (3) the average probability of a vessel’s 
returning safely from the ground over the previous five years (again, informa- 
tion documented in the local press). The model rests on the assumption that, 
although the lay was the focus of the negotiation between agent and prospec- 
tive crewman, the expected real  wage (or real cost) was at the heart of the 
bargain. 
reported in table 5.1  1. Those figures are based on the year of sailing (Own Year). See note 29 for 
a discussion of  these measures. 
38. Morgan’s letter book (Morgan Collection) contains a broad sample of such instructions to 
his captains. For example, he wrote to George H. Dexter (26 August  1834), “The ship Condor 
being now ready for Sea, the owners wish you to proceed at once for Sea and as the Season is late, 
make the best of your way to the False Bank off the coast of Brazil, where we dispatch the Ship 
for a cargo of Right Whale oil.” The following month (24 September) he wrote to Cornelius How- 
land Jr.: “The Ship Magnolia under your Command being now ready for Sea-I  proceed to give 
such general instructions for the voyage as are required. The Ship is bound for the Pacific Ocean 
for a Cargo of Sperm Oil, and is amply fitted for a Cruise of four years.” 188  Chapter 5 
Table 5.11  Labor Market Efficiency, New Bedford Whaling Vessels, Sailing 
Years 184&58 
Dependent Variables 
Expected Monthly Wage, 
Expected Monthly Wage,  Unskilled Seaman, 















Intercept  8.294*  8.556* 
Financial risk  0.00070*  0.00003 
Voyage length (months squared)  -0.136*  -0.141* 
“Time at sea” risk  0.417*  0.392* 
Ground (compared to Pacijc) 
Atlantic  -3.008* 
Indian  -0.526* 




Sources: Voyages, Productivity, and Stations and Lays data sets. 
Nore: Although greenhand lays are available for 1866, we omitted the year from the calculations 
in order to eliminate from the regressions the persisting effects of the extraordinary events of the 
Civil War. 
*Significant at the 1 percent level. 
Table 5.11 reports the results of two alternative specifications of the model. 
The dependent variable in model  1 is the average monthly real value of  the 
catch of vessels that had returned from the designated ground in the previous 
year, multiplied by  the average lay negotiated by  greenhands in the present 
year-it  is, in short, a proxy for the expected real monthly wage.39  The depen- 
dent  variable  in  model  2  is  the  expected  real  wage  variable  of  model  1 
multiplied by the average probability (calculated over the previous five years) 
that a vessel setting out for the designated ground would return safely to New 
Bedford. 
There are six independent variables. Three relate to the factors that, theoreti- 
cally, influenced the relative real wage rates in the four grounds: financial risk, 
time at sea, and the risk of  spending more time at sea than expected.40  The 
second set are the three ground dummies-the  Pacific was chosen as the base, 
39. The deflator employed was the David and Solar index of consumer prices (David and Solar 
1977, 16-17).  The wage is Own Year. 
40. The financial risk variable is the standard deviation of  the value of  the catch of  vessels 
returning from the designated ground in year (t -  1). The measure of voyage length is the average 
interval for vessels returning from the designated ground in (t -  1). The measure of “time at sea” 
risk is the standard deviation of the voyage length. 189  Labor 
and is the implicit fourth ground. If the model captures the essence of the wage 
bargain, the coefficients on the ground dummies should be close to zero. 
The results are decidedly mixed. The adjusted R2 are good, given the ele- 
ment of luck in the industry, and the F values are both very high and significant. 
If  attention is focused on the first set of  variables, the model seems to have 
captured the principal elements of the wage negotiation  that both theory and 
the qualitative  literature suggest dominated  the bargain. The ground coeffi- 
cients indicate, however, that, after the effects of the first set of variables have 
been factored out, there remain even larger differences among the expected 
earnings in the four grounds. 
Theory suggests that workers usually prefer lesser to greater financial risk; 
this  conjecture  is borne  out  by  the  analysis. The coefficient  on  “financial 
risk”-measured  by the standard deviation of the returns-is  positive in both 
models and highly significant in one, but the coefficients on this variable are 
very small. 
The variable “time at sea” is intended to be an index of the expected duration 
of the voyage. It is the average duration of the voyages-by  hunting ground- 
of vessels returning to New Bedford in the previous year. The industry’s histori- 
ans point out that the desertion rate rose as the length of the voyage increased, 
and infer that whalemen preferred short voyages. It is likely that the association 
reflects, not a preference for short voyages, but a perfectly reasonable prefer- 
ence for successful ones. Exceptionally long voyages tended to be unsuccess- 
ful. Strong-minded captains who were unwilling to return  with empty cargo 
space would remain at sea, despite the grumblings of  the crew. Leaving these 
cases aside, many men must have preferred the security of employment offered 
by planned longer voyages. On the one hand, if men with these preferences 
dominated the market, one could expect the sign on the coefficient of the vari- 
able “time at sea” to be negative, as it is: men required a premium for a short 
voyage. On the other hand, the sign on the variable “time at sea” risk, that is, 
the risk of spending more time at sea than anticipated-a  measure of the stan- 
dard deviation of the “time at sea” variable-might  well be positive, since the 
variable is intended to pick up anticipations of chances of success. It is posi- 
tive, and the coefficients are quite large and highly significant. 
The first set of variables seems to capture the essence of the negotiation, and 
indicates that the market was ~orking.~’  The ground dummies are much less 
successful. If the model were correct and complete, one would expect the coef- 
ficients on the dummies to be insignificantly different from zero, but this is not 
the case. 
After  adjusting  for “physical,”  “financial,” and  “at  sea” risk  and  for  the 
length of the voyage, a prospective hand appears to have been willing to sacri- 
41. The relationships however, are unstable. For example, if the variance is substituted for the 
standard deviation (“financial risk” and “risk of  spending more time at sea than anticipated’), the 
signs on the financial risk and voyage duration variables shift. But the results with respect to 
the dummies change little. 190  Chapter 5 
fice $0.59 a month to serve in the Indian Ocean and $3.13 a month to serve in 
the Atlantic, rather than the Pacific; he required a premium of $5.43 to sail to 
the Western Arctic. The differences probably reflect, in part, very strong tastes 
and biases; the Arctic was an unpleasant place to be. It is also true that the 
model is incomplete. The dummies may be picking up the effects of missing 
variables. For example, the model leaves out of account the behavior of people 
and institutions on the other side of the labor market. Despite its shortcomings, 
the model provides helpful hints about the nature of the market. 
5.4  Deterioration in Productivity and Crew Quality 
The years 1840-58  were characterized by a decline in vessel productivity, on 
the one hand, and gradually increasing proportions of unskilled and illiterate 
workers among crews, on the other (see table 5.12). Between 1840-43  and 
1856-58,  for example, the average productivity index declined by more than 
one-third, illiteracy rose by nearly 30 percent, and the proportion of unskilled 
seamen in the crew rose by more than one-quarter. In the early 1840s  just over 
one-fifth of the crew were illiterate and fewer than three-tenths had no mari- 
time experience.  On the eve of the Civil War,  more than one-quarter  of the 
crew were illiterate, and more than six-tenths had never before been to sea. 
The declines in crew quality and average voyage productivity need not be- 
speak causal connections.  In order to pursue that  topic further, a model de- 
signed to explain productivity  change in general  is required.  The effects of 
changes in crew quality and the movements of other relevant independent vari- 
ables can then be systematically assessed. To complete the explanation it is, of 
course, also necessary to consider how and why crew quality declined and how 
the managers of  whaling voyages dealt with the decline. The place to begin is 
with the model. 
The same model used to examine the contributions of the captain to a voy- 
age’s productivity can be employed in the effort to understand  the changing 
quality of labor (see chapter 8 for a fuller discussion). It has been argued in 
the whaling literature that, as time passed, the quality of labor available to the 
industry declined because of improving opportunities ashore. To capture this 
development, indexes of real wage rates ashore are introduced as independent 
variables. Increases in wages ashore would bid the best whalemen away from 
the fleet, we assumed, and lead to a deterioration in the quality of the whaling 
labor force, thus reducing productivity.42  The model and data appear strongly 
to support the conclusion that rising wages bid the best labor away from whal- 
42. It may appear that the wage rates of other seagoing occupations would be preferable; in fact, 
they are not. As the evidence has indicated, merchant seamen and whalemen were different breeds 
of cat, and the markets for the two were quite different. In any case it is opportunities ashore, not 
opportunities elsewhere afloat, that figure in the hypothesis in the literature. It may also appear 
that the proper variable should he, not the real wage rate ashore, hut the ratio of the wage rate 
ashore to the wage rate in whaling. We could not use this ratio because we do not have the neces- 
sary data on the wage rate in whaling for all years. Table 5.12  Crew and Voyage Characteristics,  All Grounds, New Bedford 
Whaling Voyages, Sailing Years 1840-58  and 1866 
A. Crew Characteristics 
% of Crew  % of Crew  % of Seamen 



































































































B. Index Numbers on the Base 1840 (= 100) 
Year 
% of Crew  % of Crew  % of Seamen 
Who Are  Who Are  Who Are 
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Table 5.12  (continued) 
% of Crew  % of  Crew  % of  Seamen 
Who Are  Who Are  Who Are 










































































Source: Stations and Lays and Productivity data sets. 
Nore: This table excludes crewmen who did not sail with the voyage. It includes those who signed 
on with more than one occupation,  using the first occupation mentioned. 
'The  productivity estimates underlying this column were computed from data for  the voyages 
represented in the remaining columns of the table. 
ing. If direct measures of labor quality (fraction illiterate; fraction greenhands) 
are substituted for the indexes of real wage rates ashore, however, the results 
do not support the conclusion that labor-quality  changes were directly related 
to productivity (see chapter 8). 
It is probable that the contradiction is only apparent. First, the pull of  on- 
shore wages-taken  together with agents' attempts to lessen labor turnover by 
substituting unskilled for skilled crewmen-tended  to reduce the quality of 
workers and,  therefore, productivity. Second, new techniques were introduced 
that permitted  seamen of  lower quality to function  acceptably. Agents  who 
made these technical changes could employ such seamen with significant suc- 
cess. Across time, then, one might expect to find that the quality factor forced 
productivity down; but, in the cross section (once allowance is made for cross- 
time deterioration), the vessels that adopted the new technology could employ 
lower-quality crews and were, therefore, more productive than the vessels that 
did not. The evidence suggests that the argument is correct; whether it is per- 
suasive depends on the nature of the decline in labor quality and the kinds of 
adjustments to it that were made by agents and captains. (See chapters 7 and 8 
for further treatment of this topic.) 193  Labor 
The rise in the proportions of illiterate and unskilled crewmen on a typical 
vessel may also have been a product of agents’ attempts to recruit crew mem- 
bers who would be less likely to desert. Contemporary sources suggest that 
agents, concerned with the very high rates of labor turnover, sought to employ 
workers who, because of  their lack of  information and skills, would find it 
difficult to leave their vessels and sign on others. Nordhoff (1895, 12), for 
example, reports that, despite the almost constant demand for whaling crews, 
“To a sailor this avenue to a whaleship is hermetically sealed. Neither here 
[New York] nor in New Bedford is he at all likely to be shipped-for  experi- 
ence has taught the captains and owners of whaling vessels that your real tar is 
too uneasy a creature to be kept in good order for so long a cruise as whalemen 
now-a-days generally make.” The policy was  also noted by  Hohman (1928, 
62): “The shipping-agent preferred to deal with men ignorant of  the actual 
conditions of  the industry because they were more easily imposed upon, and 
also because they were more dependable in observing their 
As voyage length increased, so did desertions-Herman  Melville managed 
to desert twice during his brief whaling career-and,  if  agents’ letters and 
the surviving account books are to be believed, labor turnover emerged as an 
increasingly important problem. The difficult life aside, there are a number of 
explanations for the problem of  desertion. The role of the advance as an in- 
ducement to desert has been discussed; the inducement was  certainly rein- 
forced when the crewman found himself  on  a vessel that  was performing 
poorly. Thus, the fact that the Gratitude arrived at Talcahuano “clean” may 
explain the loss of seven or eight men and a whaleboat; that the captain of the 
James Allen, because of a poor catch, attempted to extend the voyage by thirty 
months could account for the furtive departure of  seven crewmen; that the 
Newport vessel Helen Augusta had taken “no oil” may have convinced seven 
men to desert in Java and another six to take a whaleboat and depart in the 
middle of the North Atlantic (WSL 6 April 1852, 28 March 1854, 9 October 
1855). 
An increase in opportunity cost also appears to have played role in the deci- 
sion to break the labor contract; gold fever turned crewmen’s minds to alluring 
alternatives. In  1850 a traveler noted: “The harbor of  Honolulu was  full of 
whalemen, and officers and crews were deserting every opportunity [in order 
to go to California]. The mountains are said to be full of runaway sailors” (WSL 
12 February 1850). 
Even so, the captain of  the Brumin must have been surprised to discover 
upon his return from a trip ashore on Maui that his ship had disappeared; “it is 
supposed that the crew rose, took the vessel from the officers, and started for 
California.” Similarly, Captain Hamblin of the New Bedford probably did not 
43. “The question was even injected into the original shipping of a crew in the home port; for 
one of the reasons for preferring green hands lay in the fact that they were less resourceful in 
matters relating to desertion” (Hohman 1928, 66). 194  Chapter 5 
expect that his entire crew would desert when he docked in Paita in April of 
1850 (WSL  12 March, 21 May  1850). The previous month, at Hilo, the second 
mate, a boatsteerer, the carpenter, the blacksmith, and a seaman from the Caro- 
line stole a boat and navigation equipment and set out for California, while in 
Guam the fourth mate, two boatsteerers, two seamen, and the carpenter stole a 
boat from the Mount Vernon and headed for California by way of Manila (WSL 
2 July,  16 July  1850). Nor was it only California gold that lured whalemen 
away from their ships. When in 1853 the Montezuma dropped anchor in Auck- 
land, New Zealand, the entire crew deserted and went to the mines (WSL 14 
June, 4  July 1853). 
So great was the problem that the Board of Underwriters of Marine Insur- 
ance in New York  adopted a resolution “upon receiving reliable information 
of the voluntary desertion of a ship by  a shipmaster for more lucrative employ- 
ment, to place the name of  such master on the list of  suspended shipmasters 
. . .  until his conduct is satisfactorily explained,” and to refuse insurance to any 
vessel employing such a captain (WSL  28 August 1849). 
The inducements must have been strong or the life very unpleasant, since 
desertion was not without cost. The five seamen who deserted the Eleanor and 
the Liverpool off Patagonia in  1848 suffered from hunger and cold for ten 
months, and two died, before a New London vessel discovered the survivors. 
When  gold  fever  swept  the  Minerva,  the  crew  deserted en  masse;  three 
drowned attempting to swim ashore. Of  the six men who left the Gratitude, 
four drowned while attempting to land their boat (WSL 10 October 1848, 20 
February 1849,6  April 1852, 1 June 1852). 
Desertion could reduce profits not only directly, by the loss of unrepaid ad- 
vances, but also indirectly, by its effects on productivity. A vessel’s complement 
usually consisted of  only a few more men (the shipkeepers) than the number 
required to provide six for each whaleboat; an unreplaced crewman could 
mean the loss of  an entire boat. Probably more important was the effect on 
productivity of  the replacement of  a member of  one of  the “closely-linked 
whaleboat crews, where the loss of a single cool and expert oarsman often cut 
down materially the captures made by  a certain boat” (Hohman 1928,65). 
Because of the costs incurred in these desertions, captains spent consider- 
able time and money attempting to recapture their wayward charges and, if that 
effort failed, to see that they were severely punished under local or Massachu- 
setts law.  In  1852 the industry was shocked by  the punishment handed the 
fourteen seamen of the Champion who, while sailing off the coast of Chile, 
“after confining the officers and remainder of  the crew below  . . . took two 
boats and made for the land.” Upon their return to New Bedford three of the 
deserters were arrested and transferred to Boston for trial, where, in the U.S. 
district court, they were convicted of larceny of the whaleboats. Their sentence: 
six days’ imprisonment. “Judges must have very confused notions of the depth 
of guilt involved in the offense which these men committed,” commented the 
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By relaxing certain production constraints, technological change permitted 
captains and agents to adjust their workforce in a way that they thought would 
reduce turnover. Before  1850 improvements aloft-in  rigging, winches, sail 
plan, and sails-and  after 1850  improvements in vessel design made it possible 
to alter dramatically the skill profile of the crew (see chapter 7). The changes 
aloft, by greatly easing and simplifying the tasks of setting, changing, and furl- 
ing the sails, made it possible for unskilled crewmen to handle most of the 
above-deck work that had previously required trained hands. The new designs 
also made it easier to steer and maneuver a vessel. Thus, both sets of technical 
innovations  made it possible to substitute greenhands for able and ordinary 
seamen. 
The evidence, both quantitative and qualitative, conclusively demonstrates 
that, by a traditional definition, the quality of whaling crews deteriorated over 
at least two decades preceding the Civil War. Qualitative sources suggest that 
the decline was the result of a conscious decision by agents, aimed at reducing 
labor turnover and thus increasing profits. It is impossible to prove that this 
was so; it may have been instead (or in addition) a reaction to the increasing 
difficulty  of  recruiting native Yankee whalemen-a  difficulty rooted  in the 
rising competition for onshore labor. 
It may be only coincidental, but the developing manufacturing sector under- 
went a similar substitution of unskilled for skilled labor at about the same time. 
Although it is unlikely that labor turnover played a significant role in that case, 
labor historians have recognized  that the  development of  new  technologies 
made it possible for managers to substitute less-skilled for more-skilled labor. 
Goldin and Sokoloff (1982, 755), for example, note, “The relationship be- 
tween firm size and the employment of women and children within industries 
indicates that the diffusion  of  new, large-scale  technologies was associated 
with the substitution of women and children for men.”“ 
In whaling the policy was not costless to either agent or crewman. It greatly 
increased the twin problems of supervision and discipline, and the direct cost 
of the necessary discipline was borne in the first instance by the crew. As one 
chronicler reports, “Examination of the crews’ account books gives an insight 
into the changes taking place in the kind of men who shipped aboard whalers 
and the measures taken by the agents and captains to compensate for the in- 
creasingly poor quality of the crews. Whether the decrease in quality of per- 
sonnel led to the harsh measures,  or whether  the  methods  of  the  captains, 
agents, and landsharks led to the poor quality was a question probably debated 
endlessly by the owners and agents” (Moment  1957, 274). There is general 
agreement that “the owners were content to ship such [untrained] hands .  , . 
because capable and brutally aggressive mates could train them during the long 
months at sea” (Hohman 1928,62). 
44. For a complete discussion of  the evidence, see Goldin and Sokoloff 1982, 741-44;  1984, 
461-68. 196  Chapter5 
As the composition of  the crew changed, and perhaps in response to the 
increased levels of brutality (although causality may have gone the other way), 
sailors’ behavior began to exceed the normal bounds of  conduct. Murder, at 
least of officers, remained uncommon, but mutinies increased; there were five 
in 1857 alone. Sometimes, as in the case of the Marcella (upon the death of the 
captain the crew refused to sail anywhere but home), the mutiny was peaceful. 
Sometimes it wasn’t. After a crewman on the Morning Star stabbed the mate, 
“the rest  of  the crew  who  sympathized with  their comrade, drew pistols, 
knives, and other weapons.” The mutiny was put down only with the assistance 
of the British frigate Monarch. A bloodier fate befell the officers of the Junior 
cruising off New Zealand. Five mutineers beheaded the captain, shot the first 
and second mates, stabbed the third mate to death, and took over the vessel 
(WSL 12 October 1852, 15 September 1857,6April 1858). 
Usually mutineers were captured and hanged or imprisoned, but occasion- 
ally they were successful. The Marcella, for example, did return to New Bed- 
ford. In  1857 the officers and crew of the James and Edward, then cruising 
near Mauritius, mutinied against the captain. The American consul placed the 
mutineers in irons, but after hearing the case against the captain he refused to 
prosecute and chose to “discharge the whole, officers and crew, claiming three 
months extra pay for each man” (WSL  28 April 1857). 
Desertions and mutinies were both aimed at breaking the labor contract; at 
times crewmen took  even more direct-and  probably more risky-action. 
There are numerous instances of  attempts by  crewmen to end a voyage by 
sinking the vessel, often while at sea. The preferred method was arson, but 
boring holes in the bottom of the vessel was a clear second choice. The captain 
of  the Hectol; for example, suddenly discovered eleven feet of  water in the 
hold. Arson was sometimes discovered before serious damage had been done, 
but frequently the saboteurs were at least partially successful. The Emma, the 
George Washington, and the Pantheon were burned to the waterline and de- 
clared total losses. The captains of the Canton Packet, the Tobacco Plant, and 
the Addison scuttled their vessels, put out the fires, and salvaged something. 
For the Pantheon, the arson attempt was the second on the voyage; for the 
William Thompson (damage $6,000), the attempt was the third.45 
The officers, of course, responded that the men had to be trained, and behav- 
ior that flew in the face of good order and discipline had to be modified. The 
stories of brutality on whaling vessels are legion. In 1848 a judge held that the 
captain of  the James Murray had slightly exceeded his authority when he or- 
dered a crewman tied to the rigging and “gave him seventeen blows on the 
back with a piece of tow-line, about three feet long and from two to two and a 
quarter inches in circumference.” The problem wasn’t  the flogging itself, ac- 
cording to the judge; it was the rope, which “in the hands of  an athletic man 
45. WSL 7 February 1854, 15 November 1853, 20 May,  17 June, 24 June  1856, 16 February 
1847, 12 February 1850,5 December 1854,2 November 1847. 197  Labor 
. . . might inflict permanent injury to one not of  a robust frame.” Since the 
seaman had been able to perform his duties after the incident and was thus 
clearly not permanently injured, the judge awarded him “a very small amount 
only in damages” (WSL 1 August 1848). 
The United States outlawed whipping seamen for punishment in 1850, but 
the law was not always obeyed. In  1854 the captain of  the Gratitude was ar- 
rested for flogging a crewman in an “unjustifiable” manner. Nine years later, 
awarding a crewman who had been flogged $60 and costs, the judge of the U.S. 
district court in Boston “remarked, that the masters of whaleships manifested a 
disposition to defy the law and the court, and distinctly announced that. . .  this 
law against flogging, while it remained on the statute book, should be enforced, 
and that the penalty of its violation would be increased in form and severity 
until obedience is yielded.”46 
Flogging was not the only form of physical abuse. The captain of the Globe 
was indicted for assaulting a sailor with a handspike, the captain of the Emma 
was arraigned for assaulting two crewmen with “a dangerous weapon” (a gun- 
stock), and the captain of the Callao was tried for assaulting a seaman with a 
bung-knocker. The charge against the Emma’s captain was dismissed in one 
case because the crewman had disobeyed an order. The Callao’s captain was 
acquitted because “the bung-knocker was discreetly used” (WSL 17 September 
1850, 30 September 1851, 28 September 1858). 
The essence of these stories is contained in the report of the U.S. revenue 
cutter Thetes on its return from a trip to the Arctic whaling fleet in September 
1906. On board were fourteen sick whalemen, thirty victims of shipwreck, and 
two whaling captains, H. E. Bodfish of the William Bayless and E. W.  Newth 
of the Jeannette,  in irons. Both captains were charged with manslaughter in 
the deaths of  seamen-Bodfish,  with kicking a seaman to death (Williams 
The need for increased supervision and discipline meant that a vessel re- 
quired more “capable and brutally aggressive mates,” and additional mates 
were  not costless. The new  labor policy rid the industry of  some of  those 
skilled seamen who knew when and how to desert, but it forced the agents 
to hire more supervisory personnel. The result was a change in the size and 
composition of the crew that led directly to a significant increase in total direct 
labor costs. 
Tables 5.13 and 5.14 compare average crews in the two four-year periods 
1840-43 and 1855-58. Between those dates, despite the substitution of smaller 
barks for larger ships-a  substitution that should have reduced crew size by 3 
percent-the  size of a typical crew actually increased by 2.4 men or about 9 
percent (from just over 26.6 to just over 29 men). Of  equal interest are the 
1988, 32,46-48). 
46. WSL 1 August 1854.27 January 1863. In the last case the judge commented, however, “that 
it was not for the Court to decide whether the legislation was wise or unwise; that in his opinion, 
the law was passed by  men who knew nothing of the practical management of  seamen, and were 
influenced entirely by  sentiment.” Table 5.13  Average Numbers of Crewmen per Voyage, by Occupation, New 
Bedford Whaling Voyages, Sailing Years 1840-43 and 1855-58 
A. Professionals 
Skilled 
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Change  -0.96  -0.98  3.37  -0.04  -0.04  2.40 
% change  -33.3  -29.1  41.7  -6.1  -  100.0  9.0 
Source: Stations and Lays Data Set. 
Nores: The table excludes crewmen who signed on after the voyage sailed. It includes crewmen 
who reported more than one occupation, counting them as one-half of a man for each. 
Captains and first through fourth mates 
bBoatsteerers, fifth mates, second boatsteerers, preventive boatsteerers,  head-a-boats,  extra pre- 
pared boatsteerers, shipkeepers, and assistant boatsteerers. 
‘Coopers, blacksmiths, carpenters, sailmakers, second coopers, second carpenters, boatbuilders, 
second blacksmiths, painters, mechanicshachinists, caulkers, and coppersmiths. 
dCooks, stewards, and second stewards 
‘Seamen, able seamen, and lookouts 
‘Ordinary seamen, oarsmen, mariners, and “one-voyage” men. 
gGreenhands, landsmen, green oarsmen, and other crewmen designated as green. 
”oys,  cabin boys, and greenhand boys. 199  Labor 
Table 5.14  Skill Composition of a Typical Crew, New Bedford Whaling Voyages, 
Sailing Years 1840-43  and 1855-58  (percentage of crew) 
A. Professionals 
Skilled 
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30.6  - 
2.8  0.3 
2.1  0.1 
2.1  0.3 
2.5  0.0 
2.4  0.2 
2.0  0.0 
2.2  0.0 
1.8  0.1 
2.2  0.0 
2.1  0.0 
-0.3  -0.2 
12.5  -  100.0 
Source. Stations and Lays Data Set. 
Nore: See table 5.13 notes. 
changes that occurred within the crew. The increase of 2.4 was the result of an 
increase of 3.4 in the number of unskilled seamen, a decrease of about 2.0 in 
the number of  skilled and semi-skilled seamen, and an increase of  1.0 in the 
number of “professionals.” Not surprisingly, the number of artisans and service 
personnel changed little. By the end of the period a typical vessel carried an 
extra 0.4 of  an officer and 0.4 of a skilled maritime professional. Those addi- 
tions constitute 10 percent and 12 percent increases in the number of crewmen 
in the two job categories. 200  Chapter 5 
Assuming that the extra officers were most likely third mates and that skilled 
maritime  workers  were  paid  as much  as  boatsteerers,  the  substitution  of 
greenhands, officers, and skilled maritime professionals for skilled and semi- 
skilled seamen meant that labor costs would have risen on average by about 
$24.50 a month or about $1,054 for a typical forty-three-month voyage. That 
estimate does not reflect the increases in the wages of officers, at least some 
of which can be attributed to their greater supervisory duties. An anonymous 
shipowner in a letter published in the WSL  on 16  June 1857 objected to rising 
lays for captains: “The high rates that are paid to whaling masters, appears to 
me to be a subject demanding something more than a passing notice. I am glad 
the matter has been introduced to the attention of ship owners . . . like every 
other business, a reasonable lay should only be demanded and given.” 
The effects of the change can be seen in table 5.15. It displays, by year, the 
fraction of  the catch that accrued to labor through lay shares (i.e., excluding 
charges, supplements, and the value of room and board). The view of Hohman 
and others before him was that on every voyage the sum of all lays was very 
close to 30 percent of the value of  the catch, and that the total was invariant 
over time. These figures tell a different  Between 1840-43  and 1855-58 
the average lay share rose from about 31 to about 36 percent, an increase of 
about one-seventh, but it fell back to about 34 percent in 1866. 
Changes in labor policies, whether initially  innovative or merely reactive, 
did apparently result in higher total factor productivity. Two questions remain: 
Did the  increase in productivity  offset the transfer of  4.5 percent of  output 
from owners to workers? What was the effect of the agents’ “labor market 
innovation” on profits? 
5.5  Conclusions 
The lay system of labor payments has some near relatives, such as the ag- 
ricultural  sharecrop system, and has been  at least as damned as they. Both 
Samuel Morison (1961,320-21)  and Elmo Hohman (1928,224), for example, 
complain about the negative impact that the institution had on the wages of 
seamen. 
Labor historian Gerald Williams (1988, 39-40)  argues that, toward the end 
of  the nineteenth century, agents and owners reaped  another boon from the 
47. According to Hohman (1926, 669), “These figures were first given in an article by  J. R. 
Williams . . . in the North American Review for January, 1834, vol. xxxviii, p.  105. They were 
corroborated by Joseph Grinnell, Speech on the Tariff, with Statistical Tables of the Whale Fishery, 
p. 9, published in 1844.” Hohman himself found a similar figure (30.3 percent) in his compilation 
of “a chance sampling of seven voyages for which suitable and accurate figures were available. . . . 
These voyages were scattered over the period 1805-50,” 
It should be noted that neither Hohman nor others who have argued for the 30 percent figure 
have included the value of room and board in their determination of the labor share. The estimates 
we have made suggest that an adjustment for board alone would have increased individual earnings 
by between $3.50 and $6.00 a month in 1840-43 and between $4.70 and $8.00 a month in 1855- 
58. These figures represent substantial values, compared with the average monthly earnings of 
whalemen (see table 5.6). 201  Labor 
Table 5.15  Labor’s Share of the Net Value of the Catch, All Grounds, New 
Bedford Whaling Voyages, Sailing Years 1840-58 and 1866 
%  Relative (1840 = 100) 



















































































28.1  1  .Ooo 
26.9  1.006 
26.1  1.016 
28.1  1.006 
26.5  1.026 
28.3  1.016 
28.2  1.032 
27.0  1.023 
26.3  1.023 
26.6  1.026 
29.0  1.078 
28.7  1.110 
29.5  1.114 
28.6  1.117 
29.6  1.123 
30.1  1.162 
30.9  1.169 
30.6  1.182 
29.5  1.133 
28.2  1.097 
28.3  1.075 
30.9  1.182 
26.1  1  .Ooo 
27.3  1.006 
30.3  1.162 
3  .O  0.156 
11.0  15.5 






















































Source: Stations and Lays Data Set. 
Note: This table omits crew members who did not sail with the vessel. 
system-a  boon that could not have been anticipated at the industry’s peak. 
Because of the judicial interpretation of the lay contract, owners found them- 
selves almost entirely exempt from the federal laws designed to improve the 
life of American seamen. These laws included the Shipping Commissioners’ 
Act (1 872) that, together with its amendments, made it more difficult to shang- 
hai sailors and guaranteed mariners a minimum level of rations, space, and 
medical treatment; the White Act (1  898) that abolished both criminal penalties 
for desertion and corporal punishment; and the Seamen’s Act of 1915 that pro- 
vided for minimum safety standards (e.g.,  lifeboat^).^^ 
48. An Act to Authorize the Appointment of Shipping-Commissioners . . . ,  1872, Sfats.  at Large 
of  USA 17:262-80; An Act to Amend the Laws relating to American Seamen, for the Protection 
of  Such Seamen, and to Promote Commerce, 1898, U.S.  Srafures  ar Lorge 30755-64;  An Act to 
Promote the Welfare of American Seamen. . .  ,  1915, US.  Sratutes af  Large 38:1164-85. Whaling 202  Chapter 5 
Despite its shortcomings, the system had many interesting, and some un- 
doubtedly useful, attributes. Most importantly  it should be noted that these 
were voluntary contracts, and knowledge about the hardships that were likely 
to be encountered was seldom lacking.49 Crewmen signed on because  they 
wanted to. Certainly owners benefitted from transfemng a portion of the risk 
of the voyage to the crew, although, given the regularized system of  advances, 
the payment of room and board, and the occasional renegotiations of lays, the 
transfer was not complete. Even critics of the lay contract (Hohman, for ex- 
ample) admit that at least some crew members revelled in a chance to partici- 
pate in the “big lottery.” 
Without question,  the lay  contract  provided  an incentive  system that  re- 
warded cooperation-an  important matter whose virtues were as evident to 
the seamen as to the agents and owners. Every contemporary account of the 
hunt and the subsequent rendering of oil underscores the level of cooperation 
required among ~rewmen.’~  Finally, the system appears to have been flexible 
enough to permit agents to adjust rapidly to emerging interground differences 
in productivity and to the reduced skill demands of  the new sailing techno- 
logies. 
Appendix 5A 
Numbers of Voyages, Numbers of Crew Contracts, 
Value of Catch, and Voyage Duration Data 
Tables 5A.1  and 5A.2 compare the subset of  New Bedford whaling voyages 
for which crew contracts have been obtained to the Voyages Data Set as a 
whole. Table 5A.3 outlines the coverage of the Stations and Lays Data Set, 
which underlies most of the calculations in this chapter. 
seamen would still be excluded from many protections. See U.S.  Code Annorated, vol. 46, sec. 
544: “None of the provisions of  [the Shipping Commissioners’ Act] . . .  shall apply . . . in any case 
where the seamen are by  custom or agreement entitled to participate in the profits or result of a 
cruise, or  voyage” (interpreted in Johnson  v.  Standard Oil Co. ofNew Jersey [D.C. Md.  19401, 
Federal Supplement 331982434). 
49. Some of those signing were so young that one may doubt they truly knew what they were 
getting into, but their numbers were probably not large. For example, in a sample of 285 crew lists 
in the years 1842-58 (chiefly 1843-49).  145 crewmen were 15 years old or younger (the youngest 
was 9), but this group accounted for only 2.5 percent of all the crewmen on these voyages. The 
median age of  all crewmen was just over 22 years; the voyage mean ages ranged between  18.8 
and 29.4. 
50. “I noticed throughout this arduous day’s work, the general alacrity of the crew in striving to 
do their utmost, and . .  . the advantages of  giving each man a proportion of  the vessel’s earnings, 
instead of monthly wages; in our case all felt themselves personally  interested, and conducted 
themselves accordingly” (Whitecar 1864,96). Table 5A.1  Numbers of New Bedford Whaling Voyages in the Stations and Lays 
Data Set and the Voyages Data Set, by Ground, Sailing Years 
1840-58  and 1866 
All Grounds  Atlantic  Indian 
With  With  With 























15  75 
56  74 
59  80 
50  77 
72  98 
52  91 
61  71 
56  76 
56  73 
53  65 
68  83 
I15  137 
62  76 
85  106 
84  102 
73  96 
74  95 
73  97 
50  65 
36  56 
1,250  1,693 

























































































Pacific  Western Arctic  Mixed 
With  With  With 










































































































(continued) Table 5A.1  (continued) 
Pacific  Western Arctic  Mixed 
With  With  With 
Year  Contracts  Total  Contracts  Total  Contracts  Total 
1855  41  51  9  14  5  8 
1856  43  55  13  17  9  11 
1857  41  59  16  17  4  4 
1858  26  32  12  16  2  4 
1866  13  21  5  8  1  2 
Total  712  946  147  181  116  154 
Means  35.6  47.3  13.4"  16.5"  5.8  7.7 
Note: Although there are no voyages in the Stations and Lays Data Set for which ground is missing, 
there are two voyages in the Voyages Data Set in these years for which ground is missing. They 
are omitted from this table. 
"These are means across the eleven years in which there were Western Arctic voyages. 
Table 5A.2  Two Comparisons of the Stations and Lays Data Set to the Voyages 
Data Set, New Bedford Whaling Voyages, Sailing Years 1840-58 and 
1866 
Ratios, Stations and Lays Data Set to Voyages Data Set 
Average Value of  Catch  Average Length of  Voyage 
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Sources: Stations and Lays, Productivity, and Voyages data sets. 205  Labor 
Table 5A.3  Numbers of Contracts in the Stations and Lays Data Set, New 
Bedford Whaling Voyages, Sailing Years 1840-58 and 1866 
All  Western 



























































































































































Note:  This table reports only contracts  for crewmen who sailed with  their vessels from New 
Bedford. 
'This  is the mean over the eleven years in which there were Western Arctic voyages. 
Appendix 5B 
Crewmen with Two Occupations 
A little more than 8 percent (2,706) of the crewmen for whom we have found 
contracts and who sailed with their vessels from New Bedford were recorded 
in the ships' papers as having two occupations. The largest numbers (summing 
to 2,320, or about 86 percent of  the total of  2,706) appeared in the groups 
listed in table 5B.1.  Further details are given in table 5B.2. 
Reasons for the double occupations are readily imagined. For example, on 
a four-boat vessel (three-boat vessel) on which the captain headed a boat, the 
fourth mate (third mate) would probably not have his own boat and might, 
instead, serve as boatsteerer for the captain or one of the other mates. (In fact, 
most of the mates with second occupations served as boatsteerers.) Artisans 
(coopers, blacksmiths, and carpenters) typically  practiced  their trades only 
when whales were not being killed. When the whaleboats were on the water, 206  Chapter 5 
Table 5B.1  Principal Groups of Crewmen with Two Occupations, New Bedford 
Whaling Voyages, Sailing Years 1840-58  and 1866 
Total  Number with  Number with  7~  with 














































Source: Stations and Lays Data Set. 
Note: Crewmen with two occupations appear twice herein, once for each occupation (assuming 
that both occupations are among those selected for this table). 
some artisans pulled oars, and some served as shipkeepers or in the crew run 
by the shipkeeper. Indeed, the surprising aspect of the table is not that some 
artisans were recorded with second occupations, but that some were not. 
Mates with second occupations typically drew roughly the same lays as all 
other mates (see table 5B.3). Since the second occupation of a mate was bound 
to  be  inferior  to  his  first  occupation,  it  may  seem  puzzling  that  single- 
occupation mates did not receive a premium. The explanation that comes to 
mind is that the second occupation of  a mate was usually boatsteerer. It may 
be that boatsteerers and mates were regarded as equally important in the boats, 
and that mates received  shorter lays than boatsteerers because of  the greater 
importance of their work aboard ship. If that were the case, one would expect 
to find mates and mate-boatsteerers receiving the same lays. 
In all other instances, crewmen with two occupations drew shorter lays. In 
the case of boatsteerers, this  is easy enough to understand:  those with two 
occupations were often mates, and, as demonstrated immediately above, boat- 
steerer-mates received roughly the same lays as mates, which means that they 
received shorter lays than boatsteerers. 
The cases of seamen and greenhands are also easy enough to understand. If 
these crewmen held second occupations, they were very likely to be occupa- 
tions superior to seaman or greenhand. (Only a boy is inferior to a greenhand.) 
If the lay of  a crewman with two occupations was something approximating 
an average of the lays usually paid to each of the two occupations (which seems 
plausible), then seamen or greenhands with second occupations would almost 
necessarily have shorter lays than single-occupation seamen or greenhands. 
Why double-occupation artisans could successfully bargain for shorter lays 
than those of single-occupation artisans is not clear, but it is possible that there 
is a computational explanation. Suppose the lays of double-occupation artisans Table 5B.2  Crew Members with Second Occupations, New Bedford Whaling 
Voyages, Sailing Years 1840-58  and 1866 
First Occupation Listed  Second Occupation Listed 
5 second mate 
140 third mate 
191 fourth mate 


















3 third mate 
14 fourth mate 
1 fifth mate 
15 head-a-boat 
13  cooper 
2 1 blacksmith 
43 carpenter 





1 third mate 





1 ordinary seaman 
2 greenhand 








1 second cooper 
28 shipkeeper 
41 seaman 
13 ordinary seaman 
14 greenhand 
(continued) Table 5B.2  (continued) 
First Occupation Listed  Second Occupation Listed 
2 mariner 
1 green something 
6 seaman 
1 ordinary seaman 
4  greenhand 
1 past greenhand 
1 boatsteerer 
3 blacksmith 
12 second cooper  I blacksmith 
1 second carpenter 
21 cook  1 second boatsteerer 
66 steward 
3 1 shipkeeper 
1 second cook 
112 seaman 





1 assistant boatsteerer 
2 boatsteerer 













1 steerage master 
1 head-a-boat 
3 1 boatsteerer 
18 blacksmith 
16 carpenter 




2 green something 






6 second cooper 
2 second carpenter 
2 painter 
1 shipkeeper Table 5B.2  (continued) 








1 bow hand 
89 carpenter 
1 sailmaker 
22 second cooper 




1 second cook 
6 ordinary seaman 
1 boy 
1 has been coasting 
1 mechanic 
1 steward 







I  assistant boatsteerer 
13 green something  10 seaman 
3 ordinary seaman 
Source: Stations and Lays Data Set. 
Table 5B.3  Average Lays of Whaling Crewmen with One and Two Occupations, 
Sailing from New Bedford, Sailing Years 1840-58  and 1866 




























Source: Stations and Lays Data Set. 
Notes: Crewmen with two occupations appear twice, once for each occupation. The occupations 
included in this table are those that occur most often for double-occupation crewmen. 210  Chapter 5 
Table 5B.4  Average Lays of One- and Two-Occupation  Crewmen, by Vessel Size, 
New Bedford Whaling Voyages, Sailing Years 1840-58  and 1866 
Large Vessels  Small Vessels 
Lay  N  Lay  N 
One-occupation crewmen  153.8  9,366  114.8  2,127 
no-occupation crewmen  117.3  301  81.7  109 
Sources: Stations and Lays and Voyages data sets. 
Nora: Large vessels have values for the variable CREW greater than 30, small have values less 
than or equal to 22. See chapter 3 for a description of the construction of the variable CREW. 
were typically some average of the lays obtainable for each of the two occupa- 
tions. Then artisan-greenhands would earn longer lays than plain artisans, and 
artisan-boatsteerers (or mates) would earn shorter lays than plain artisans. The 
relationship between the lays of one- and two-occupation artisans of a particu- 
lar type-say,  carpenters-would  depend upon  the relative  lays of the two 
types of two-occupation carpenters, and the weights attached to each of them. 
If, for example, the lays of  carpenters were closer to the lays of  greenhands 
than to the lays of boatsteerers (which they were), or if carpenter-boatsteerers 
were more common than carpenter-greenhands, then the average lays of two- 
occupation  carpenters  would  be  shorter  than  the  average  lays  of  one- 
occupation carpenters. (Greenhand and boatsteerer are used above to refer to 
inferior and superior occupations.) 
These explanations are plausible, but they are not the only explanations pos- 
sible. We know that lays were shorter on small vessels than on big ones. It 
seems reasonable to suppose that there might be more two-occupation crew- 
men on small than on large vessels, for reasons of scale. Before the fact it 
seemed possible to us that the two-occupation crewmen got short lays because 
they were concentrated on small vessels. We tested this proposition and found 
that it did not hold up. If the seeming advantages of two-occupation crewmen 
were due simply to the concentration of two-occupation crewmen on small 
vessels, one would expect to find few two-occupation crewmen on large ves- 
sels, and one would also expect to find that, once vessel size had been factored 
in, there was no longer any advantage for two-occupation crewmen. In fact, 
neither of these statements proved true, as table 5B.4 shows. Two-occupation 
crewmen were a little more common on small than on large vessels, but the 
difference was not great; shorter lays went to two-occupation crewmen on both 
large and small vessels. 
Finally, it is possible that two-occupation  crewmen did not get simply the 
average lay of their two occupations. Perhaps they also received a premium for 
their versatility. That would be a difficult matter to detect in the data, but it 
could be another explanation for the short lays obtained by two-occupation 
crewmen. 211  Labor 
In the text and the tables of  this chapter, we used all crewmen when we 
computed  aggregates, such as crew size. The analysis of lays, however, de- 
pends exclusively on data for one-occupation crewmen. In view of the ambigu- 
ities attached to the two-occupation data, that seemed to be the safest thing to 
do. The number of two-occupation crewmen, bear in mind, was small, com- 
pared with the total number of  crewmen, so that little was lost by excluding 
them from the analysis of lays. 
Appendix 5C 
Subsistence on Whalers 
Estimates of  subsistence costs were required  to make the productivity  esti- 
mates reported in chapter 8 and to draw comparisons between  the earnings 
of  whalemen and the earnings of workers ashore. We made use of data from 
Hohman,which he says he took from a pamphlet compiled by Joseph Grinnell, 
“Speech on the Tariff, with Statistical Tables of the Whale Fishery,” published 
in 1844 (Hohman 1928,325). (The speech mentioned in the title was given by 
Grinnell [member from New Bedford] to Congress on 1 May  1844.) The data 
consist of detailed outfitting lists (including quantities and prices) for a sperm 
whaler and for a right whaler. There is a question about Grinnell’s intentions 
in preparing these lists. Was he compiling only the items in the original outfit- 
ting of the vessels, or did he intend to indicate the requirements of their entire 
voyages? 
Consider how adequate the supplies Grinnell listed were, given the probable 
durations of the voyages and the numbers of men in the crews. According to his 
data, sperm whalers carried an average of twenty-seven men and right whalers, 
twenty-eight men. Voyage durations of twenty-nine months for sperm whalers, 
and twenty-three months for right whalers, can be derived from Hohman’s re- 
port of ship-arrival data for 1843 (1928, 323, 327). All of these figures (provis- 
ions, prices, crew numbers, voyage lengths) imply that it took about $60 a year 
(approximately $57 for a right whaler and $63 for a sperm whaler) to feed a 
crewman (prices of  1844), given that Grinnell meant to estimate subsistence 
for the full voyage. But did he? 
First we need some standards. The typical basic allowance for an adult male 
slave in the American South at this time was one-half pound of  meat and a 
quart or more of cornmeal a day, with other items thrown in as they were avail- 
able-sometimes  as  supplements,  and  sometimes  as  substitutes  (Gallman 
1970, 9). Adult slaves appear to have been pretty well fed, in the sense that 
they got plenty of calories and protein. Washington’s army received a somewhat 
more abundant basic allowance of a pound of meat and a pound of bread a day 
during the Revolutionary War (U.S.  Department of Commerce 1975, series Z- 
203, 204,205). What kind of  a basic diet does Grinnell’s table allow? 212  Chapter5 
Grinnell outfits a sperm whaler with 240 barrels of beef and pork, a right 
whaler with  163 barrels. This is the entire meat allowance. Arthur Harrison 
Cole (1938, x) says that barrels of beef and pork after  1789 contained 200 
pounds of meat. Therefore, 
Sperm whaler: 240 bbl. X 200 lb. = 48,000 lb., or 1,655.17 lb. per month, 
if the voyage took 29 months. This gives 61.30 lb. per man per month, with 
a crew of  27, or 2.04 lb. per man per day. Even with substantial losses to 
rats and mold, the meat allowance seems more than adequate. 
Right whaler: 163 bbl. X 200 lb. = 32,600 lb., or 1,417.39 lb. per month 
(voyage of 23 months), 50.62 lb. per man-month, and 1.69 lb. per man-day; 
again, more than adequate. (Remember that whalemen spent a substantial 
fraction of their time in idleness.) 
Grinnell lists 240 barrels of flour for a sperm whaler and 155 barrels for a 
right whaler. A barrel of flour contained 196 pounds of flour, from which 284.2 
pounds of hard bread could be made (Cole 1938, x; U.S. Department of Agri- 
culture 1952, 38). 
Sperm whaler: 240 bbl.  X  284.2 lb. = 68,208 lb. of bread, or 2,352.00 
lb. per month, 87.11 lb. per man-month, and 2.90 lb. per man-day. No doubt 
some was lost or wasted, and no doubt some of the bread was duff, rather 
than hard bread (flour probably produced less duff, per pound, than it did 
bread). Nonetheless, nobody wanted for bread on Mr. Grinnell’s whalers. 
Right whaler:  155 bbl.  X  284.2 lb. = 44,051 lb., or  1,915.26 lb. per 
month, 68.40 lb. per man-month, and 2.28 lb. per man-day: still plenty. 
That is not the end of the list. Grinnell identifies a long array of additional 
75 bu. of corn X 56 lb. per bushel (U.S.D.A., 50) = 4,200 lb., or 144.83 
5 bbl. of corn meal  X  200 lb. = 1000 lb., or 34.48 Ib. per month, and 
1,200 lb. of rice, or 41.38 lb. per month, and 1.53 lb. per man-month 
150 bu. of potatoes  X  60 Ib.  = 9,000 lb., or 310.34 lb. per month, and 
14 bu. of  peas and beans X 60 lb. = 840 lb., or 28.97 lb. per month, and 
Add all that together and you  get almost 21 pounds per man-month of corn, 
rice, potatoes, and peas and beans, or almost 0.70 pounds per man per day. 
In addition, he lists 800 pounds of cheese, 900 pounds of butter, 600 pounds 
of  dried apples,  10 barrels of  vinegar, 800 pounds of  cod,  1,600 gallons of 
molasses, 200 pounds of raisins,  1,000 pounds of  sugar, plus coffee and tea 
(and crewmen caught dolphins, etc.). 
Given these computations, there is a  strong suggestion that Grinnell in- 
tended his tables of allowances to show the total subsistence for a voyage. True, 
he left out oranges, limes, lemons, and so forth, but they would have added 
provisions. On a sperm whaler, for example, he lists 
lb. per month, and 5.36 lb. per man-month 
1.28 lb. per man-month 
11.49 lb. per man-month 
1.07 lb. per man-month 213  Labor 
only minutely to the bill. Since Grinnell’s figures are almost certainly an unre- 
alistically high appraisal of  the true costs of  providing whalers with bread, 
meat, and drink, we did not add anything to the $60 allowance in  order to 
provide for fresh produce. The $60 seems truly an upper-bound estimate. 
A lower-bound estimate was derived from a table printed in Hohman (1928, 
315) showing, among other things, the annual expenses of  the U.S. whaling 
fleet. This table was originally appended to a report dated 1858 from the U.S. 
Consulate in Paita to an assistant secretary of  state. According to the table, 
masters each spent about $1,200 per year for “fresh supplies.” Since the con- 
sular report implies that in 1858 the typical crew was 24.77 men (it reports the 
U.S. whaling fleet as employing  16,370 crewmen on 661 vessels), the total 
comes to $48.45 per man per year, in prices of 1858. Deflating by the Warren 
and Pearson food price index (U.S. Department of Commerce 1975, series E- 
54) yields an 1844 value of $35.96. We rounded this downward to $35. 
The $60 upper-bound  estimate and the $35 lower-bound estimate are in 
1844 dollars. We assumed that subsistence requirements in real terms did not 
change  over time. We  estimated current-price subsistence  requirements by 
multiplying real values by the Warren and Pearson food price index shifted to 
the base 1844 without reweighting, and expressed in decimal form. 